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Protest Policing and the Fourth
Amendment
Shawn E. Fields*
Police crowd control techniques have come under increased scrutiny after
viral videos of unprovoked violence against protesters dominated airwaves
in 2020. Many demonstrators, and at least two state attorneys general,
pursued civil rights claims claiming excessive use offorce under the Fourth
Amendment. While debate rages over the merits of those claims,
surprisingly little scholarly literature exists to examine an important
relatedthresholdquestion: does the FourthAmendment apply at all to police
violence against protesters? This Article provides the first sustained
treatment of the issue, highlighting how the United States Supreme Court's
narrow definition of "seizure" and cramped notion of Fourth Amendment
"standing" cast doubt on demonstrators' ability to sustain claims of
excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. The Court has long defined a
"seizure" as requiringan intent to submit a suspect to an officer's grasp, but
crowd control techniques are designed to disperse rather than restrain
protesters. Moreover, questions abound regarding whether actual
submission or physical force are required to constitute a seizure, as well as
what one means by "submission" or a physical touching in a crowd
dispersed by chemical munitions. As to standing, while some individuals
may assert personal claims, more recent attempts to aggregate protester
claims through class actions or State-led parens patriae actions seem to
contravene the Court's strict rejection of vicarious standing in Fourth
Amendment cases. This Article critiques both the Court's seizure and
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standing jurisprudence as contrary to the original purpose of the
amendment, articulatesa novel "restrainton liberty" theory of seizures that
incorporates the command to leave as equivalent to the command to stay,
and charts a principled path forward for class action and state
representative actions limited to the mass demonstrationcontext.
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INTRODUCTION

Street protests against racism and police brutality became a defining
feature of 2020 following George Floyd's murder by a Minneapolis
police officer. 1 Ironically, many of these protests seeking redress for
excessive police violence were met with coordinated excessive police
violence. Tear gas canisters rained down on peaceful protesters in
Raleigh, North Carolina. 2 Batons cracked the skulls of kneeling
demonstrators in Washington, D.C.3 Police vehicles became battering
rams used to disperse chanting crowds in New York City. 4 Pepper spray

I See, e.g., Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May
Be the Largest Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowdsize.html {https://perma.cc/MKE7-9UQC] (suggesting that "about 15 million to 26
million people in the United States have participated in demonstrations over the death
of George Floyd and others in recent weeks"); Protests Across the Globe After George
Floyd's Death, CNN (June 13, 2020, 3:22 PM ET), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/06/
world/gallery/intl-george-floyd-protests/index.html [https://perma.cc/S9PB-BDCD]
("From London to Pretoria to Sydney, people took to the streets to express the need for
police reform and racial equality."); see also Girardeau A. Spann, Good Trouble, U. CH.
L. REV. ONLINE 35, 35 (2020) ("[T]he distressingly cavalier murder of a Black man
named George Floyd by a White Minneapolis police officer named Derek Chauvin
prompted an unexpectedly prominent and sustained public outcry against the
persistence of racism in the United States.").
2 See Anna Johnson & Ashad Hajela, Raleigh Police Used Expired Tear Gas on
George Floyd Protesters, New Report Says, NEWS & OBSERVER (Sept. 15, 2020, 4:04 PM),
https://www.newsobserver.com/news/local/counties/wake-county/articte245725665.html
[https://perma.cc/6ZPV-VC6VI; Amanda Lamb, Consultant: Raleigh Police Need Better
Policies on Using Force, Tear Gas on Crowds, WRAL (Nov. 10, 2020, 5:37 AM EST),
https://www.wral. com/consultant-raleigh-police-need-better-policies-on-using-forcetear-gas-on-crowds/19378671/ [https://perma.cc/WV5K-Y39Z]; Raleigh Police Used
Tear Gas 252 Times, City Spent More Than $1 Million on George Floyd Protests, Report
Says, ABC11 (Sept. 15, 2020), https://abcll.com/raleigh-police-protests-george-floydin-may/6424640/ [https://perma.cc/XY93-RH8J?type=image].
3 See Andy Sullivan & Jonathan Landay, On the Streets of Washington, Pleas for
Change Met with Batons and Rubber Bullets, REUTERS (June 2, 2020, 12:55 PM),
https://www.reuters. com/article/us-minneapolis-police-washingtondc/on-the-streets-ofwashington-pleas-for-change-met-with-batons-and-rubber-bullets-idUSKBN2392VX
[https://perma.cc/7KUE-U935]; see also Oliver Holmes, Helen Sullivan, Maanvi Singh,
Sam Levin, Joan E. Greve & Martin Pengelly, US Police Forcefully Crack Down on
Protesters as Curfews Fail to Stop Demonstrations- as it Happened, GUARDIAN (June 2,
2020, 6:29 AM EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/live/2020/jun/01/georgefloyd-protests-donald-trump-white-house-washington-police-brutality-minneapolislatest-news-updates [https://perma.cc/C78S-FZEN] (noting that "protestors appeared
to be acting peacefully before they were dispersed by force").
4 See Scott Fallon, Video Shows NYPD SUVs Ram into Crowd ProtestingGeorge Floyd
Killing; Mayor's Comments Criticized, USA TODAY (May 31, 2020, 12:42 PM ET),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/05/31/new-york-city-george-floyd-
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burned the retinas of peaceful activists after police pulled down
protective face masks.5 Secretive federal police roamed the streets of
Portland in unmarked cars, "disappearing" journalists and protesters
into undisclosed holding cells for hours, only to release them later
without charge or a record of the encounter. 6
These types of state-sponsored violence appear ripe for adjudication
as civil rights violations of demonstrators' Fourth Amendment
guarantee against police excessive use of force.? These "Section 1983"
claims, so named because of the Civil Rights Act's place in the United
States Code, 8 have become notorious for their inability to grant
meaningful relief to victims of egregious acts of police violence. 9 Facing

protests-nypd-suvs-brooklyn-crowd/5299746002/ Ihttps://perma.cc/7SRT-2FJ4] ("Two
as the crowd
New York Police Department vehicles plowed into demonstrators ...
pushed a barricade against one of them and pelted it with objects."); Tara Law, Footage
of NYPD Vehicles Surging into Crowd of ProtestersSparks FurtherOutrage, TIME (May 31,
2020, 11:36 AM EDT), https://time.com/5845631/nypd-protests-vehicles-protesters/

Ihttps://perma.cc/7QRD-UN8R}.

5 See Lauren Cook, Watch: Cop Pulls Mask Off Man, PepperSprays Him in the Face,
PIXl (May 31, 2020, 9:15 AM EDT), https://www.pixll.com/news/local-news/watch[https://perma.cc/3NM7-TVG2]
cop-pulls-mask-off-man-pepper-sprays-him-in-the-face
("An officer . . walks up to [a] man, pulls his mask down and sprays him directly in
the face while the man's hands are in the air, the video shows.").
6 See Jonathan Levinson, Conrad Wilson, James Doubek & Suzanne Nuyen,
Federal Officers Use Unmarked Vehicles to Grab People in Portland, DHS Confirms, NPR
(July 17, 2020, 1:04 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/2020/07/17/892277592/federal[https://perma.cc/9VQKofficers-use-unmarked-vehicles-to-grab-protesters-in-portland
CS2E] (noting that "[f]ederal law enforcement officers have been using unmarked
vehicles to drive . .. up to people, detaining individuals with no explanation about why
they are being arrested, and driving off," and discussing how protestors were "put into
a cell" before being released without receiving "any paperwork, citation, or record of
[their] arrest"); see also Igor Derysh, "They're Kidnapping People": "Trump's Secret
Police" Snatch PortlandProtestersinto Unmarked Vans, SALON (July 17, 2020, 12:05 PM
EDT),
https://www.salon.com/2020/07/17/theyre-kidnapping-people-trumps-secretpolice-snatch-portland-protesters-into-unmarked-vans/ [https://perma.cc/VY34-25HJ]
(noting that "camouflaged federal officers" arrived over the objections of Oregon
Governor Kate Brown "as part of President Donald Trump's executive order to protect
American memorials, monuments, and statues").
7 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (discussing Fourth
Amendment "excessive force claims brought under § 1983" and explaining that "§ 1983
'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating
federal rights elsewhere conferred"' (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3
(1979))).
8 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018); see Mitch Zamoff, Determining the Perspective of a
Reasonable Police Officer: An Evidence-Based Proposal, 65 VILL. L. REv. 585, 599 (2020).
9 One of the most damning recent indictments of the impotence of § 1983 claims
comes from a United States District Judge, Carlton W. Reeves, who considered whether
a Black man "pulled over and subjected to one hundred and ten minutes of an armed
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the dual hurdles of a lenient reasonable force jurisprudence and a nearabsolute qualified immunity defense, excessive force plaintiffs
increasingly find themselves shut out of court without being able to
present, or even discover, relevant evidence.1 0 A growing chorus of
scholars," politicians,' 2 and protesters themselves 3 are calling to

police officer badgering him, pressuring him, lying to him, and then searching his car
top-to-bottom for drugs" had his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures violated under § 1983. Jamison v. McClendon, 476 F. Supp. 3d
386, 391 (S.D. Miss. 2020). Judge Reeves cites two dozen examples of police brutality
before excoriating the United States Supreme Court's expansion of qualified immunity
as "dispensling] with any pretense of competing values" and "protect[ing] all officers,
no matter how egregious their conduct." Id. at 390-91, 403-04. At the end of the 72page opinion, Judge Reeves "reluctantly" follows precedent, grants qualified immunity,
and dismisses the case. Id. at 423-24.
10 See Shawn E. Fields, Weaponized Racial Fear, 93 TUL. L. REV. 931, 982 (2019)
(describing how "this multilayered system of protection for police abuse [has rendered]
qualified immunity . . . closer to a system of absolute immunity for most defendants,
resulting in a finding of liability for only the most extreme and most shocking misuses
of police power").
"
See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Who Is Responsible for the Stealth Assault on Civil
Rights?, 114 MICH. L. REV. 893, 908-11 (2016) (noting qualified immunity serves as a
barrier to excessive force claims and calling for the Court's remedial jurisprudence to
be reevaluated); William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45,
80-82 (2018) (discussing the future of qualified immunity and calling for the doctrine
to be narrowed); Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1797, 1800 (2018) (calling for the Justices to "end qualified immunity in
a single decision" and to "end it now"). For an example of a scholar whose work in this
subject led to almost immediate legislative change, see Tatyana Hopkins, DC Adopts GW
Law Professor's Model Legislation on Police Use of Force, GW TODAY (June 12, 2020),
https://gwtoday.gwu.edu/dc-adopts-gw-law-professor%E2%80%99s-model-legislationpolice-use-force [https://perma.cc/C8KJ-9DVC], describing D.C. Council's unanimous
adoption of Professor Cynthia Lee's model legislation redefining reasonable use of force
articulated in Reforming the Law on Police Use of Deadly Force: De-Escalation, Pre-Seizure
Conduct, and Imperfect Self-Defense, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 629, 664-65 (2018).
12 See Jackie DeFusco, Virginia House Kills Bill to End Qualified Immunity for Police
Officers, Scaled-Back Senate Proposal Lives On, ABC8 (Jan. 29, 2021, 7:23 PM EST),
https://www.wric.com/news/virginia-house-kills-bill-to-end-qualified-immunity-for[https://perma.cc/KZ89-6BTU];
police-officers-scaled-back-senate-proposal-lives-on/
Christianna Silva, Cory Booker Wants to End Qualified Immunity for Police Officers, NPR
Qune 7, 2020, 8:29 PM EST), https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-forracial-justice/2020/06/07/871713872/cory-booker-wants-to-end-qualified-immunityfor-police-officers [https://perma.cc/L3NL-CCPS].
'3

Ben Cohen, Better Policing Begins with Accountability and an End to Qualified

Immunity, USA TODAY (Jan. 27, 2021, 7:43 PM ET), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
opinion/policing/2021/01/27/better-policing-begins-accountability-end-qualifiedimmunity-column/4251822001/ [https://perma.cc/U6P4-ZLVJ] (describing grass roots
movements aimed at ending qualified immunity).

352

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 55:347

redefine what the law considers objectively reasonable use of force and
to narrow or even eliminate qualified immunity.
This Article does not wade into that urgent discussion. Rather, it asks
an important and undertheorized related question: does the Fourth
Amendment apply at all to protest policing cases? In other words, before
the merits of a demonstrator's claim of police abuse can be assessed, can
the demonstrator even cross the "Fourth Amendment threshold" to
trigger constitutional scrutiny?1 4 At first blush, the answer appears
obviously to be, "yes." After all, a protester pelted with pepper balls,
tear gas, or other chemical munitions has been subjected to force by an
officer, giving rise to at least a claim that such force was constitutionally
unreasonable.
That may not be the case. Excessive force claims are adjudicated as
"unreasonable seizures" under the Fourth Amendment,15 and the
United States Supreme Court's narrow and multilayered definition of
"seizure" casts serious doubts on the claims of protesters subjected to
crowd control techniques. The Court has long referred to seizures as
requiring intentional conduct by a police officer to submit a suspect to
the officer's grasp, thus restricting the individual's "free[dom] to
leave." 16 But protest policing has the opposite motivation. Officers
lobbing flash bang grenades into crowds do not want to make the crowd
stay; they want the crowd to go away. While little case law addresses
the issue directly, a handful of courts have rejected claims that the
Fourth Amendment applies at all in protest-policing cases under this
dispersal versus submission distinction.17

14 See Alafair S. Burke, Consent Searches and FourthAmendment Reasonableness, 67
FLA. L. REV. 509, 520 (2015) (observing that when the Court "remov[es] encounters
from the definition of 'seizure,"' it renders that police activity as "beneath the Fourth
Amendment threshold" and thus leaves "no role for the judiciary under the Fourth
Amendment to scrutinize the reasonableness of the encounter at all"); Andrew Guthrie
Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the FourthAmendment of Effects, 104 CALIF. L. REV.
805, 829-35 (2016) (describing the ever-moving Fourth Amendment threshold in
search law cases).
15 See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 376 (2007) (considering a § 1983 claim
"alleging, inter alia, a violation of his federal constitutional rights, viz. use of excessive
force resulting in an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment"); see also
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643-44 (1987) (explaining that excessive force
cases are governed by the unreasonable seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment).
16 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) ("We conclude that a
person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view
of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have
believed that he was not free to leave.").
17 See, e.g., Edrei v. City of New York, 254 F. Supp. 3d 565, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)
(finding that police use of acoustic device to disperse crowd did not constitute a seizure
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An additional aspect of the Court's seizure jurisprudence further
complicates the analysis. For nearly thirty years, the Court has required
a seizure to be effectuated by either "physical force" or a "show of
authority ... coupled with actual submission." 18 In other words, absent
a physical touching, no seizure occurs unless the target of police
conduct actually submits. 19 But what constitutes "actual submission" in
the protest policing context, if not submission to arrest or detention,
remains an open question. The boundaries of "physical force" are more
vague in a world where crowd control tactics involve not only the
dissemination of diffuse gaseous particles "wafting" over demonstrators
but long-range acoustic devices designed to blare away the crowd. 20
Even the distinction between physical force and shows of authority
appears to be crumbling, as the Supreme Court recently was forced to
resolve on narrow grounds a circuit split over whether intentionally
shooting a fleeing suspect (clearly physical force) constitutes a seizure
if the suspect temporarily evades capture. 21
After exploring these issues and critiquing the Court's artificially
narrow approach to seizure cases, this Article articulates a "restraint on
liberty" theory of Fourth Amendment seizure that accords with the
underlying purpose of the Fourth Amendment and better reflects the
practical reality of modern-day policing, including protest policing.
because the officers never "intentionally" meant to "restrain" any demonstrator);
Dundon v. Kirchmeier, No. 1:16-cv-406, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222696, at *57-62
(D.N.D. Feb. 7, 2017), affd. mem., 701 F. App'x. 538 (8th Cir. 2017) (per curiam)
(finding that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to claims of police abuse brought
by protesters pelted with water cannons and tear gas canisters because they were never
"seized").

18 California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 637-38 (1991).
19 Id.
20 See Edrei, 254 F. Supp. 3d at 574 (denying Fourth Amendment protection to
protesters subjected to noise violence by police); Lamb v. City of Decatur, 947 F. Supp.
1261, 1265 (C.D. Ill. 1996) (distinguishing between non-arrested demonstrators
directly in line of pepper spray and demonstrators further removed from police action);
Renee Paradis, Carpe Demonstratores: Towards a Bright-Line Rule Governing Seizure in
Excessive Force Claims Brought by Demonstrators, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 316, 338 (2003)
(describing a court's division of two "separate plaintiff classes" and directing a verdict
against the "waft class").
21 See Torres v. Madrid, 141 S. Ct. 989, 1003 (2021) ("We hold that the application
of physical force to the body of a person with intent to restrain is a seizure even if the
person does not submit and is not subdued."); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
1, Torres v. Madrid, 769 Fed. App'x 654 (10th Cir. 2019) (No. 19-292) (seeking
Supreme Court review in case where "police officers shot Petitioner, but she drove away
and temporarily eluded capture," when such physical force alone constitutes a seizure
in the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal but not in the Tenth or
D.C. Circuit Courts of Appeal).
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This theory posits that any intentional restriction on an individual's
freedom of movement constitutes a seizure, whether the restriction
infringes the freedom to go or the freedom to stay. Both situations
involve a formal, armed government command to stop moving freely,
which at root is the state action sought to be restricted by the Fourth
Amendment's seizure provision. 22 Moreover, this theory does away with
the physical force and show of authority distinction, in recognition both
of the increasingly unworkable nature of the distinction and the
significant violence a nonphysical show of authority can bear on a
citizen in a comparatively powerless encounter with law enforcement.
This approach admittedly would broaden the range of police conduct
subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny, but not necessarily the range of
police conduct deemed unconstitutional. The calculus simply would
shift from threshold questions of whether a seizure occurred to
substantive questions of whether the seizure was reasonable. Such a
shift is long overdue in the Court's tortured search law jurisprudence
and would bring principled clarity in its seizure cases as well. 23
But even if these seizure questions can be resolved satisfactorily, a
second Fourth Amendment threshold issue arises in the protest policing
context: standing. Little question exists that an individual personally
seized by an officer has standing to pursue an excessive force claim,
subject to Article III's injury, causation, and redressability
requirements. 24 But in the wake of police violence against mass groups
of demonstrators during 2020's "Summer of Racial Reckoning," 25 a
22 See Laura K. Donohue, The OriginalFourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181,
1281 (2016) (observing that the Fourth Amendment's inclusion in the Constitution was
a paramount priority for those "concern[ed] ... as to whether the structural protections
[of the Constitution] would be sufficient to restrain a stronger national government");
id. at 1286 (quoting founding concern that police "may, unless the general government
be restrained by a bill of rights, . .. go into your cellars and rooms, and search, ransack,
and measure everything you eat, drink, and wear").
23 See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349,375 (1974) (decrying the Court's tortured definition of "search," which leaves
us with "a [F]ourth [Ajmendment with all of the character and consistency of a
Rorschach blot"); Jeffrey Bellin, Fourth Amendment Textualism, 118 MICH. L. REV. 233,
238-40 (2019) (advocating a return to the plain, dictionary meaning of the word
"search," which would shift the focus of search analysis to reasonableness of the police
action and eschew the "vacuous word play" defining the last half century of search law
jurisprudence).
24 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 103-04 (1998) ("This triad of
injury in fact, causation, and redressability constitutes the core of Article III's case-orcontroversy requirement .... ").
25 Ailsa Chang, Rachel Martin & Eric Marrapodi, Summer of Racial Reckoning, NPR

(Aug. 16, 2020, 9:00 AM EST), https://www.npr.org/2020/08/16/902179773/summerof-racial-reckoning-the-match-lit. [https://perma.cc/PP6Z-Q23C].
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number of representative actions have been filed on behalf of large
groups of protesters seeking redress. The ACLU filed a class action
lawsuit on behalf of protesters and journalists in Portland,26 and the
Attorneys General of Oregon and New York filed actions on behalf of
their respective states' citizens in their parens patriae capacity. 27 Such
aggregate litigation makes practical sense given the large numbers of
affected individuals. But it is unclear if Fourth Amendment allows it.
Fourth Amendment scholars may intuitively think not. For nearly
forty years, the Supreme Court has defined substantive Fourth
Amendment "standing" (while not referring to it as such) narrowly,
reaffirming time and again that Fourth Amendment rights are personal
and may never be asserted vicariously. 28 In so doing, the Court has
denied standing to injured "targets" of clear police abuses unless those
targets also possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place
or thing searched by police. 29 This cramped approach to Fourth
Amendment standing has drawn ire and ridicule from numerous

26 Second Amended Complaint at 16, Index Newspapers LLC v. City of Portland,
No. 3:20-cv-1035-SI (D. Or. July 17, 2020) (asserting class claims arising from "It]he
police's use of excessive force against neutral observers [that] extends to all Plaintiff
class members and other neutrals").
27 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, State of New York v. City
of New York, No. 1:21-cv-00322 (S.D.N.Y Jan. 14, 2021) ("The People of the State of
New York, by their Attorney General, Letitia James, bring this action to end the
pervasive use of excessive force and false arrests by the New York City Police
Department (NYPD) against New Yorkers in suppressing overwhelmingly peaceful
protests."); Complaint at 1, 3, Rosenblum v. Does 1-10, No. 3:20-cv-01161-MO (D. Or.
July 17, 2020) (asserting parens patriae standing to challenge actions of "federal law
enforcement officers [who] . . . have been using unmarked vehicles to drive around
downtown Portland, detain protesters, and place them into the officers' unmarked
vehicles, removing them from public without either arresting them or stating the basis
for an arrest, since at least Tuesday, July 14").
28 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978) (denying the "target" of an
unlawful search standing to assert a Fourth Amendment claim unless that target had a
reasonable expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment and re-affirming
may not be vicariously
that "Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which ...
asserted" (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)). Class actions
are not "vicarious" in the prudential standing sense, but nonetheless rarely succeed for
reasons tied to the Court's narrow Fourth Amendment standing framework. See infra
Part I.
29 Donald L. Doernberg, "The Right of the People": Reconciling Collective and
Individual Interests Under the Fourth Amendment, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 259, 264-65 (1983)
(retracing pre-Rahas precedent suggesting "that being the target of a search might itself
suffice to confer standing .... Under such a target theory, standing would be extended
to 'anyone legitimately on the premises when a search occurs . . . [if] its fruits are
proposed to be used against him."' (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267
(1960))).
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scholars. 30 But both the case law and the commentary on Fourth
Amendment standing involves only search law issues; virtually no
major cases have considered Fourth Amendment "standing"
requirements in unreasonable seizure cases. 3 1 This Article provides the
first systematic treatment of standing issues in the context of Fourth
Amendment seizures. 32

Much of that treatment centers on the relationship between Fourth
Amendment standing principles and representative actions, as well as
the inherent problems of aggregation of Fourth Amendment claims. In
the class action context, virtually all Fourth Amendment class claims
fail at certification because of the inherently fact- and context-specific
analyses required to adjudicate whether "reasonable suspicion" or
"probable cause" existed, or whether "reasonable force" was used. 33
These fact-intensive inquiries, guided by various totality-of-thecircumstances tests, 34 render it virtually impossible for putative classes

30 See, e.g., id. at 290-91, 294 (asserting that Rakas and its progeny ignore the
"deterrence rationale" adopted elsewhere in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which
requires "a return to the question of how that interest is to be vindicated" collectively
rather than just individually); David Gray, Collective Standing Under the Fourth
Amendment, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 77, 96-97 (2018) ("The collective damage done to the
security of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures by ... rules governing
Fourth Amendment standing is profound" and ignores the original text whereby "any
member of 'the people' should have standing to pursue prospective constitutional
remedies sufficient to guarantee their security.").
31 JOSHUA DRESSLER, ALAN C. MICHAELS & Ric SIMMONS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 334 (7th ed. 2020) ("Nearly everything the Supreme Court has said about
standing .. . has concerned challenges to police searches, rather than seizures.").
32 A number of scholars have addressed problems with existing Fourth Amendment
standing doctrine, but almost exclusively in the context of search law. See, e.g., Gregory
Brazeal, Mass Seizure and Mass Search, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001, 1013-14 (2020)
(analyzing how mass surveillance interacts with Fourth Amendment search
jurisprudence); Doermberg, supranote 29, at 270-71 (analyzing the doctrine of standing
for Fourth Amendment rights in the context of searches); Gray, supra note 30, at 86103 (analyzing Fourth Amendment standing and its "idiosyncratic definition of
'search"'). This scholarly gap makes some intuitive sense, as discussed herein. See infra
Part II.A.
33 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397-99 (1989) (defining and explaining
"objectively reasonable use of force" in seizure analyses); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30
(1968) (articulating reasonable suspicion standard for temporary involuntary
detentions); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (defining "probable
cause" as existing when facts and circumstances are "sufficient in themselves to warrant
a person of reasonable caution in the belief that" an offense has been committed or
evidence will be found).
34 See, e.g., Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (reasonable force); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 233 (1983) (probable cause); Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (reasonable suspicion); see also
Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation and ConstitutionalRights, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593,
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to demonstrate the commonality and typicality of claims needed for
aggregate treatment. 35 But protest policing may provide one exception
to this general rule, at least where a protester class can point to a single
command decision or use of force that led to substantially similar
injuries to the crowd.
Alternatively, the Oregon and New York litigations test a nearly
unprecedented use of a state's parens patriaepower to assert standing in
a Fourth Amendment action on behalf of the well-being of its citizens.
Few such cases exist, and early returns on their success is not
promising, as states fail to demonstrate that private Fourth Amendment
injuries are both sufficiently widespread to threaten the entire
population and incapable of being asserted by those private parties. 36
Here again, the protest policing context may provide an exception. The
sheer size of protest groups affected by aggressive police crowd control
techniques, the likelihood of continued clashes in the future, and the
primacy of a citizenry's collective First Amendment right to peaceably
assemble may provide the necessary size and magnitude to confer this
"special solicitude" standing. 37 As to the ability of private citizens to
bring actions in their own right, the Court's narrow Fourth Amendment
standing doctrine ironically may help demonstrate the broad incapacity
of individuals to litigate these claims on their behalf. States may also
succeed in presenting damning evidence of the disparate impacts of
protest policing methods on communities of color - particularly Black
38
communities - to press forward with state-wide harm claims. Given
621 (2012) (exploring problems of the Fourth Amendment's "totality-of-thecircumstances" tests with class action treatment).
35 See Garrett, supra note 34, at 621-24; see also McCarthy v. Kleindienst, 741 F.2d
1406, 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rejecting certification of Fourth Amendment false arrest
claims that "turn upon highly individualized proof, [where] probable cause may have
existed for . . . some putative class members").
36

See infra Part II.C.

37 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007) (recognizing "Massachusetts'
stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests" and thus granting "special solicitude
in our standing analysis").
38 See REBECCA C. HETEY, BENOIT MONIN, AMRITA MAITREYI & JENNIFER L. EBERHARDT,
DATA FOR CHANGE: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF POLICE STOPS, SEARCHES, HANDCUFFINGS,
AND ARRESTS IN OAKLAND, CALIF., 2013-2014, at 91 tbl.5.2 (2016), https://stanford.app.

box.com/v/Data-for-Change [https://perma.cc/9NQZ-N7GC] (finding that during a
thirteen-month period in Oakland, California, 2,890 African Americans were
handcuffed but not arrested, while only 193 whites were cuffed); CODY T. Ross, A
MULTI-LEVEL BAYESIAN ANALYSIS OF RACIAL BIAS IN POLICE SHOOTINGS AT THE COUNTYLEVEL IN THE UNITED STATES, 2011-2014, at 6 (2015), https://journals.plos.org/

[https:/perma.cc/
plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/joumal.pone.0141854&type=printable
C3L8-ZF841 ) ("The median probability of being {black, unarmed, and shot by policel
is about 3.49 times the probability of being {white, unarmed, and shot by policel on
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the Supreme Court's unwillingness to consider discrimination claims
based on disparate impact alone, 39 this approach may further highlight
the incapacity of private citizens to seek broad relief from police abuse.
This urgent issue is ripe for scholarly consideration. The current
movement, aimed directly at curbing police excessive force, provides a
moment of reflection for how the law fails these activists when they
themselves become the target of the injustice they seek to remedy.
Moreover, scant scholarly literature exists addressing the unique
threshold seizure issues presented by protest policing, the impact of the
Court's narrow Fourth Amendment "standing" analysis on seizure
cases, or the viability of or theoretical justifications for representative
actions in protest policing cases. This Article provides the first
comprehensive treatment of protest policing and these critical Fourth
Amendment threshold issues.

I.

PROTESTS AND FOURTH AMENDMENT SEIZURES

On June 1, 2020, a large group of protesters gathered for a seventh
straight day in Lafayette Square Park in Washington, D.C. to protest the
death of George Floyd and racial injustice in policing. 40 The park, less
than one mile from the White House, had seen violent protests and
looting in recent days, but on that afternoon the assembled protesters
stood largely motionless while chanting, many on their knees in prayer
or meditation. 41 Then, in a scene National Guard commander Adam
DeMarco later called "deeply disturbing," 4 2 a mixed group unit of Park
Police, federal law enforcement officers, and federal military personnel
dispersed the crowd with a series of pepper spray bullets, "flash bang"
grenades, tear gas, and other smoke bombs. 43 This dispersal was
average."); Joshua Correll, Bernadette Park, Charles M. Judd, Bernd Wittenbrink,
Melody S. Sadler & Tracie Keesee, Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial
Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. 1006, 1013-15 (2007)
(finding that officers in use of force simulations shot darker skinned suspects both more
quickly and with more accuracy than white suspects).
39 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245 (1976).
40

See Caroline Linton, Lafayette Square Protesters Were Subjected to "Excessive Use

of Force," NationalGuard Commander Will Testify, CBS NEws (July 27, 2020, 4:58 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/lafayette-square-protesters-were-subject-to-excessiveuse-of-force-national-guard-commander-will-testify/ [https://perma.cc/D4Z6-3V8K.
41
42

Id.

Id.
Id. (noting that DeMarco's comments "refut[ed] the attorney general's earlier
assertions that force was justified": "Having served in a combat zone, and understanding
how to assess threat environments, at no time did I feel threatened by the protesters or
assess them to be violent."); Katie Rogers, Protesters Dispersedwith Tear Gas so Trump
43
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commanded by Attorney General Bill Barr, not as a necessary safety
measure, but to clear a path for he and President Trump to walk from
the White House to nearby St. John's Episcopal Church for a photo
opportunity. 4 Trump stood in front of the church, upside down Bible
in hand, and briefly posed for photographs flanked by military officials
and aides. 45
DeMarco later testified before Congress that "excessive use of force"
was used on that day. 46 Park Police formally acknowledged the
mistake. 47 The chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, General Mark Milley,
admitted the military's participation in the disproportionate response,
as well as his participation in the photo op, was a mistake. 48 But despite
these apologies and public acknowledgements of police brutality against
peaceful protesters, it is unclear if this conduct violated or even
implicated the Fourth Amendment at all. The answer to that question
turns on the Supreme Court's narrow definition of a Fourth
Amendment "seizure."
The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and
seizures." 49 An unreasonable seizure acts as the constitutional hook
giving rise to civil rights police brutality claims, though less frequently
the seizure itself may yield evidence subject to Fourth Amendment
exclusion. 50 But as with searches, "the issue of whether police conduct
constitutes a seizure is a matter of threshold significance." 51 Unless the
police action in question is a "seizure," the Fourth Amendment simply
does not apply at all.5 2 In other words, if this Fourth Amendment
Could Pose at Church, N.Y.

TIMES

(June 1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/01/

us/politics/trump-st-johns-church-bible.html [https://perma.cc/J6V6-ZPKC].
44 See Phillip Bump, Timeline: The Clearing of Lafayette Square, WASH. POST (June 5,
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/06/02/timeline-clearing-lafayettesquare/ [https://perma.cc/89E4-VJCY].
45 Id.; Linton, supra note 40.
46

Linton, supra note 40.

47 Alex Ward, US Park Police Said Using "Tear Gas" in a Statement was a "Mistake."

It Just Used the Term Again., Vox (June 5, 2020, 4:21 PM EDT),
https//www.vox.com/2020/6/5/21281604/lafayette-square-white-house-tear-gas-protest
[https://perma.cc/S9KG-UVFXI.
48 Helene Cooper, Milley Apologizes for Trump Photo Op Role: I Should Not Have

Been There,' N.Y.

TIMES

(June 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/11/us/

politics/trump-milley-military-protests-lafayette-square.html

lhttps://perma.cc/W7UB-

RQR5].
49 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
50 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989).
51 DRESSLER, supra note 31, at 109.
52 Id.; see also Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843 (1998) ("The Fourth
Amendment covers only 'searches and seizures' .... ).
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threshold is not passed, officers can act as arbitrarily and violently as
they want and not trigger scrutiny. 53 Thus, the question of what
constitutes a "seizure" is of paramount importance.
Paradigmatically, an arrest of a suspect constitutes a seizure of that
person. 54 The Supreme Court has also held that circumstances short of
an arrest may constitute a seizure. In United States v. Mendenhall,55 the
Court held that a person has been "seized . .
if, in view of all the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would
have believed he was not free to leave."5 6 In recent years, however, the
Court has backed away from this totality-of-the-circumstances test in
favor of bright-line rules predicated on whether the officer attempted
the seizure through physical force or a "show of authority." 57 These
bright-line rules, articulated most recently in Brendlin v. California,58
require that "[a] person is seized by the police ... when the officer, by
means of physical force or show of authority, terminates or restrains
[the person's] freedom of movement through means intentionally
applied."5 9 Moreover, while a "police officer may make a seizure by a
show of authority and without the use of physical force . .. there is no
seizure without actual submission." 60
This multilayered definition presents two unique issues in the protest
policing context. First, while the typical seizure case involves an officer
attempting to "terminate ... freedom of movement" 61 and submit a
suspect to the officer's grasp, a protest police officer's intent often is not
to make the protester succumb to the officer's grasp, but to disperse a
crowd and make the protester go away. Does this matter? In other
words, has a seizure occurred when the intention of the officer is to
make the target of physical force flee rather than submit? Precedent

53 Litigants who fail to assert Fourth Amendment excessive force claims may still
proceed with Due Process claims under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. However,
those claims will be assessed under an incredibly deferential "conscience shocking"
standard. See Tierney v. Davidson, 133 F.3d 189, 199 (2d Cir. 1998) (explaining that
excessive force claims where "[p]laintiffs do not assert they were arrested or seized ...
are governed instead by the Due Process Clause"); see also Johnson v. Newburgh
Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that excessive force
claims must show "conscience-shocking" action by a government actor").
54 See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 101 (1959).

55 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
56 Id. at 545.

57 California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991);
58 551 U.S. 249 (2007).

59

Id. at 254-55.

60

Id. at 254.
Id.

61

DRESSLER, supra note 31, at 118.
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suggests the answer is no, a result at odds with the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment and anathema to a society that reveres peaceful
assembly.
Second, even if an intention to disperse can constitute a seizure in
some circumstances, it remains unclear whether a seizure occurred
when the officer's attempts are unsuccessful and the protester does not
submit to the show of authority, either by leaving the area or otherwise
acquiescing to the officer's commands. Moreover, what constitutes
"actual submission" in the protest policing context? Precedent suggests
the answers to these questions turn on whether the officer applies
physical force or a nonphysical show of authority - in the protest
policing context, a tear gas canister or a bullhorn. 62 This artificial
distinction between physical force and shows of authority leads to
absurd results, ignores the power imbalance inherent in police-civilian
interactions, and becomes practically impossible to enforce in the
protest policing context.
After exploring these unresolved questions, this section articulates a
"restraint on liberty" theory of Fourth Amendment seizure that
recognizes the need to place constitutional limits on police violence
regardless of its purpose and closes any legal loopholes current
precedent affords protest policing. For the wary, it bears reminding that
whether an action constitutes a "seizure" is merely a threshold question
allowing entrance into the Fourth Amendment labyrinth, where the
reasonableness of the police action may still prove fatal to any claims of
unlawful violence. In other words, this approach would not necessarily
radically alter the landscape of permissible police conduct, but only
subject a larger swath of that conduct to constitutional scrutiny.
A.

Protest Policing Intent

The Supreme Court has defined "seizures" as those actions whereby
an officer intentionally "terminates or restrains [one's] freedom of
movement." 63 On its own, this language could apply equally to restraint
by means of submission or restraint by means of repelling someone
from an area. In both cases is the person's freedom of movement is
restrained. But the Court's language in describing seizures clearly
implies a focus only on the former. Thus, it appears by implication that
a restraint on movement only constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure
if that restraint renders someone not "free to leave" as opposed to being
not "free to stay." If true, that distinction is critical in the protest
62

See infra Part lB.

63 Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 254.
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policing context, where officers deploy chemical agents and nonlethal
munitions to communicate to assembled crowds that they are, in fact,
free to leave but not free to stay.
Indeed, this appears to be the case: "[w]here suspects are free to leave
but not free to go about their business," courts are reluctant to find a
seizure. 64 This result "is not surprising: every time a police officer
demands that a pedestrian cross the street to avoid entering a crime
scene, for instance, that pedestrian is no longer free to go about her
business (of walking down the street)." 65 Courts have declined to find
a seizure on this principle in an array of scenarios, including where a
traffic cop ordered a driver to pull into a parking lot to clear an
intersection, 66 where a ranger pointed a gun at someone and demanded
he step away from the ranger's dog,67 and where officers pointed guns
to repel a distraught dog owner who charged them after the officers

killed his dog. 68
While seemingly unrelated to mass protests, these cases rely on the
same basic principle: that an officer's use of force or show of authority
to make someone go away does not constitute a seizure. In "large-scale
public street demonstrations . . . police intent in using force is to clear
the streets quickly by making demonstrators leave, rather than to detain
and arrest them." 69 The "seizure" moniker appears perhaps even less

Paradis, supra note 20, at 333.
65 Id. (suggesting that a "most precise reading" of Court precedent might dictate
such a result, but "lower courts may be reluctant to raise every such police-citizen
encounter to the level of a Fourth Amendment seizure").
66 See United States v. Pedroza,
269 F.3d 821, 826-27 (7th Cir. 2001)
(acknowledging factual question over whether encounter was consensual but
nonetheless concluding being forced to go somewhere else away from the officer did
not constitute a seizure).
67 See Brooks v. United States, C-94-0714-DLJ, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22021, at *1314 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 1995) (holding that the pointing of the gun only prevented the
plaintiff from attacking the ranger or his dog, but did not require him to submit for
detention).
68 See Fuller v. Vines, 36 F.3d 65, 69 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the only thing
plaintiff was restrained from doing was attacking the officers, but that he was free
otherwise to leave).
69 Paradis, supra note 20, at 334; see alSOJEROME H. SKOLNICK &JAMESJ. FYFE, ABOVE
THE LAW: POLICE AND THE ExCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 67-80 (1993) (exploring purposes and
problems of crowd control policing); SEATTLE POLICE DEPT., SEATTLE PoLICE DEPT.
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 21-OOOXX, MANUAL SECTION 14.090 - CROWD MANAGEMENT
(DRAFT) 2 (2020), https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/Police/Policy_
Review/14.090_Crowd_Control_Draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7AR-6V8L] (identifying
"crowd control and dispersal strategies" in response to "unlawful assembly," including
"issue an order to disperse; identify dispersal routes; . . . use force that is reasonable,
64
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suitable in this crowd control scenario, where officers confront
hundreds or thousands of demonstrators, making the "individualized
determinations of the sort upon which seizure cases . . . insist"
impossible.70
This narrow conception of "seizure," limited to restraints on
movement designed to result in submission to an officer's grasp, has led
multiple courts to conclude that the Fourth Amendment simply does
not apply at all in the protest policing context. In Dundon v.
Kirchmeier,71 for example, the District of North Dakota considered
claims of police brutality brought by demonstrators peacefully
protesting the construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline through
Native American tribal lands. 72 These protesters, claiming the project
threatened tribal water sources and sacred burial grounds, were blasted
with fire hoses, subjected to tear gas and concussion grenades, and hit
with rubber bullets, bean bag projectiles, and other special impact
munitions. 73 The assault, much of it taking place overnight while
protesters slept, injured over 200 people.7 4 Chief Judge Daniel Hovland
"questioned whether the Fourth Amendment even protected activists
since police sought to disperse them, instead of arrest them."7 5 In
dismissing the claim, Judge Hovland concluded that since there were
no attempts to arrest or otherwise detain any individuals, "the Fourth
Amendment did not apply at all to any of the police conduct."7 6 Leaving

necessary, and proportional to disperse or move a crowd; [and] continue to assess and
modulate response as behavior changes," but not arrest or otherwise detain).

Paradis, supra note 20, at 334.
71 No. 1:16-cv-406, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222696 (D.N.D. Feb. 7, 2017), aff'd.
70

mem., 701 F. App'x. 538 (8th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
72 See id. at *4.
73 See id. at *21-22; see also Karen J. Pita Loor, Tear Gas + Water Hoses + Dispersal
Orders: The Fourth Amendment Endorses Brutality in Protest Policing, 100 B.U. L. REV.
817, 831-32 (2020) (highlighting the "militarized police response" to the peaceful
demonstrators, including the "use of military vehicles, water cannons, fire hoses, and
special impact munitions against indigenous water protectors").
74 Pita Loor, supra note 73, at 817.
75

See id. at 838; see also Dundon, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222696, at *58 ("The

Plaintiffs have neither alleged they were arrested or detained by law enforcement
officials . . . nor alleged they were informed by law enforcement officers they were not
free to leave and walk away.").
76 Pita Loor, supra note 73, at 839; Dundon, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222696, at *5859 (finding no seizure occurred, but then "fa]ssuming for the sake of argument the
Plaintiffs have alleged viable excessive force claims . . . the indiscriminate use of water
and other forms of non-lethal force that were used that evening in the midst of the
darkened chaos" was so objectively reasonable that "no reasonable juror could conclude
the level of non-lethal force used . . . was objectively unreasonable").
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no doubt as to the importance of police intent in the analysis, Judge
Hovland reasoned that no seizure occurred, because the demonstrators
"could have just complied with the police orders to disperse," ignoring
entirely the restraint on freedom of movement necessarily entailed in
being forcibly relocated. 77
Likewise, in Edrei v. City of New York, 78 a case involving the violent
dispersal of demonstrators protesting the death of Eric Garner, the court
concluded that the use of long-range acoustic devices against activists
did not implicate the Fourth Amendment. 79 The court reasoned that,
"an officer's request to leave an area, even with use of force is not a
seizure unless 'accompanied by the use of sufficient force to intentionally
restrain a person and gain control of his movements."' 80 By recognizing
the violent impact of these novel acoustic weapons on protesters'
movements and still denying the application of the Fourth Amendment,
the court confirmed the legal impunity within which protest police
officers can operate free from constitutional excessive force claims.81
These cases reflect the legal black hole the Court's seizure
jurisprudence has created for protest police. By narrowly defining
seizures as requiring an intent to detain, the Court has implicitly
excepted from any Fourth Amendment scrutiny all crowd control
techniques no matter how unnecessary, including chemical munitions,
projectiles, water cannons, attack dogs, and acoustic devices. If the
impunity created by these cases does not sufficiently worry readers,
consider that federal agencies charged with controlling Lafayette Square
protesters sought approval to use a military device known as a "heat

77 Pita Loor, supra note 73, at 839; Dundon, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222696, at *58
("The Plaintiffs and other pipeline protesters could have easily removed themselves
from the Backwater Bridge and the presence of law enforcement by simply complying
with lawful commands, and dispersing . . ").
78 254 F. Supp. 3d 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
79 See id. at 574.
80 Id. ("While exposed to the X100, none of the Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that
their movements were restrained. Rather, Plaintiffs state that while the X100 was used
...
each Plaintiff . . . left the vicinity of the X100 as each desired, generally to escape
the noise.").
81 Similar cases involving violent crowd control tactics offer little practical
guidance. Some, like Marbet v. City of Portland, assume that a Fourth Amendment
seizure occurs when any chemical agents or other force are used without considering
the intent of the officer. Marbet v. City of Portland, No. CV 02-1448-HA, 2003 WL
23540358, at *12 (D. Or. Sept. 8, 2003). Others, like Ellsworth v. City of Lansing and
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, conclude without discussion that "where no seizure
occurs" the Fourth Amendment does not apply, assuming that dispersal tactics cannot
constitute seizures. Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846-48 (1986);
Ellsworth v. City of Lansing, 34 F. Supp. 2d 571, 580 (W.D. Mich. 1998).
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ray," an "Active Denial System . . . developed by the military . .. which
emits a directed beam of energy that causes a burning heat sensation"
and reportedly causes severe burns.82
There exists some limited contrary precedent. In at least one case, the
officer's intent to disperse an assembled crowd rather than submit an
individual to detention did not prove fatal to the petitioner's claim. In
Nelson v. City of Davis, 83 campus police fired pepper balls (rounds
containing pepper spray launched from a paint ball gun) to disperse a
student gathering, hitting the plaintiff in the eye. 84 The Ninth Circuit
seemed unconcerned that the officer firing the round had no desire to
submit any particular student to his authority, concluding that the
plaintiff was seized because he submitted to the officers' show of
authority when he dropped to the ground, remained there for fifteen
minutes, and then was driven to the hospital. 85 Notably, the court held
in the alternative that:
Even in the absence of [plaintiffs] submission, the
government's intentional application of force to [plaintiff] was
sufficient to constitute a seizure. As the Supreme Court has
made clear, the mere assertion of police authority, without the
application of force, does not constitute a seizure unless the
individual submits to that authority. Conversely, when that
show of authority includes the application of physical force, a
seizure has occurred even if the object of that force does not
submit. 86
This case provides some measure of hope for the protester who suffers
a tangible, physical injury from crowd control tactics, even one who was
not specifically targeted. 87 But it does little for those subjected only to
nonphysical shows of authority or for those who refuse to yield in the

82 Feds Sought "Heat Ray" to Clear D.C. Protesters for Trump Photo Opp: Whistleblower,
HUFFPOST (Sept. 17, 2020, 11:20 AM ET), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/heat-rayprotesters-lafayette-squaren_5f637aa8c5b6ba9eb6eadfl5 [https-//perma.cc/5C2V-KTTH].
83 685 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2012).
84

See id. at 873-74.

85 See id. at 875 (rejecting officers' claim that no seizure occurred because "the U.C.
Davis police officers took aim and intentionally fired in the direction of a group of which
[and] was rendered immobile.
Nelson was a member. Nelson was hit in the eye ...
Nelson was both an object of intentional governmental force and his freedom of
movement was limited as a result").
86

Id. at 876 n.4.

87 Cf. Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d 1323, 1329 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that
"because [the plaintiff] was hit by a bullet that was meant to stop him, he was subjected
to a Fourth Amendment seizure").
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face of protest police tactics. The Nelson court's focus on the methods
employed - physical force or show of authority - also reflect the
obsessive distinction between seizure tactics courts apply postCaliforniav. Hodari D. It is to these methods we now turn.
B.

Protest PolicingMethods

Even assuming that an intent to disperse could provide the basis for
a Fourth Amendment seizure, there remains the question of whether
the attempted seizure must be successful to trigger constitutional
scrutiny. In other words, the Fourth Amendment may not protect
against attempted but unsuccessful seizures, but only those acts of force
that result in actual submission. The answer to that question appears to
turn on whether the force is "physical" or merely a "show of authority,"
a purported bright-line distinction that becomes fuzzier in the gaseous
haze of protest policing.
When the Court defined a seized person in Mendenhall as simply "a
reasonable person [who] would have believed he was not free to leave,"
it neither required that the person actually submit nor cared what type
of conduct the officer employed to create this belief. 88 But the Court
retreated from this reasonable person test in California v. Hodari D.,89
and in so doing injected per se categories of police conduct that would
by itself create a seizure and other categories requiring actual
submission.
In Hodari D., two police officers patrolled a "high-crime area" in
Oakland in an unmarked car but while wearing jackets clearly
emblazoned on front and back with "Police." 90 When the officers
rounded a corner, five youths huddled around a red car "apparently
panicked and took flight." 91 One of the two officers pursued one of the
youths on foot - Hodari - and repeatedly called out for him to stop. 92
Just before the officer caught Hodari, the youth "tossed away what
appeared to be a small rock," which the officer later collected and
determined was crack cocaine. 93 In his motion to suppress the drugs,
Hodari argued that he had been unlawfully "seized" at the time he
discarded the rock. 94 California admitted the officer had no reasonable

88 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 545 (1980).
89 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
90 Id. at 622.

93

Id. at 623.
See id. at 626.
Id. at 623.

94

Id.

91
92
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suspicion to pursue the fleeing Hodari but claimed instead that the mere
pursuit of a suspect, absent actual apprehension, does not constitute a
seizure. 9 5

The Supreme Court agreed with California. Writing for the majority,

Justice Scalia acknowledged that an officer's pursuit of a fleeing suspect
amounts to a "show of authority," but he rejected Hodari's claim that a
"show of authority [alone] has restrained the liberty of a citizen . . even
though the subject does not yield" sufficient to trigger Fourth
Amendment seizure analysis. 96 Justice Scalia explained that "[t]he word
'seizure' readily bears the meaning of a laying on of hands or application
of physical force to retrain movement, even when it is ultimately
unsuccessful . . . But it does not remotely apply . . . to the prospect of a
policeman yelling 'Stop, in the name of the law!' at a fleeing form that
continues to flee. That is no seizure." 97 Thus, Justice Scalia eliminated
entirely Mendenhall's totality-of-the-circumstances approach and
replaced it with two bright-line rules: 1) any physical contact by a police
officer, no matter how small, constitutes a seizure even if the seizure
attempt is unsuccessful; and 2) a nonphysical "show of authority"
cannot constitute a seizure - no matter how violent, threatening, or
aggressive - unless the seizure attempt is successful.
that officers can engage in
The implication of this ruling suspicionless shows of authority, including shouting at, harassing,
chasing, and firing warning shots above individuals without triggering
Fourth Amendment scrutiny - was not lost on the dissent. Calling the
ruling "profoundly unwise," Justice Stevens discussed the potentially
"significant time interval between the initiation of the officer's show of
authority and the complete submission by the citizen." 98 In applying the
majority's approach, some commentators have argued "the police may
now lawfully chase a person - even if the pursuit includes a command
to 'freeze,' the use of police sirens, or other coercive actions - without
reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing (indeed, on no basis at all, or on a
malicious basis), in the hope that during the pursuit the citizen's
response . . . will give the police a legitimate basis to seize the
individual." 99
95 See id.
96 Id. at 626 ("The narrow question before us is whether, with respect to a show of
authority . . . a seizure occurs even though the subject does not yield. We hold that it
does not.").
97 Id.
98 Id. at 643 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99 DRESSLER, supra note 31, at 119. This concern has led several state courts to reject
Hodari D. in interpreting their own state constitutions. See, e.g., Hall v. State, 145 P.3d
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Such a broad legal loophole, through which all manner of arbitrary
and discriminatory police power may be deployed with impunity,
contravenes the Fourth Amendment's primary original purpose: to limit
random, suspicionless police abuses of power against innocent
citizens. 00 Armed government law enforcement agents are entrusted
with enormous power and control over society, a control that creates
inherent, oppressive power imbalances between officer and civilian. 01
Indeed, the Court's sensible recognition that a police officer's nonphysical "show of authority" is sufficient to effectuate a seizure is itself
an implicit acknowledgement that the command "Stop!" coming from
someone with a badge and a gun means something very different from
the same command made by anyone else. To suggest that an officer's
"show of authority" via threatening words, menacing dogs, or warning
shots is any less violent and less deserving of the "seizure" label than
even the most minor physical contact belies the limiting purpose of the
Fourth Amendment, betrays the reality of policing in America, and
leads to absurd results.1 02
Hodari D.'s high-stakes distinction between physical force and shows
of authority leaves two questions unresolved in the protest policing

&

605 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006) (defining "seizure" exclusively by means of the Mendenhall
test); State v. Oquendo, 613 A.2d 1300 (Conn. 1992) (same); In re Welfare of E.D.J.,
502 N.W.2d 779 (Minn. 1993) (same); State v. Clayton, 45 P.3d 30 (Mont. 2002)
(same); Commonwealth v. Matos, 672 A.2d 769 (Pa. 1996) (same).
100 See Donahue, supra note 22, at 1281; Ariel Marshae Harris, The Backdoor that
Leads to the Trap Door: The Unusual Effects of 18 U.S.C. § 2703(D) and Stingrays, 45 S.U.
L. REV. 134, 145 ("The Fourth Amendment's original purpose is 'to prevent, not repair
the damage of unreasonable government intrusions."' (quoting Ekins v. U.S., 364 U.S.
206, 217 (1960))); Reinart, supra note 32, at 1485-86 (observing that while "[t]he
Fourth Amendment was adopted in large part because of colonial resentment of the
general warrant[] . . . [it] was not based solely on a penchant for protecting individual
privacy . . . colonists recognized that general warrants could be used to target political
and religious dissenters.").
101 The danger of ignoring this imbalance threatens to disrupt the balance struck by
the Fourth Amendment itself. See Thomas P. Crocker, Order, Technology, and the
Constitutional Meanings of Criminal Procedure, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 685, 719
(2013) ("Courts and scholars alike view[] the power imbalance that exists between the
citizen and the police officer as informing constitutional meaning."); see also Orit Gan,
Third-PartyConsent to Search: Analyzing Triangular Relations, 19 DUKE J. GENDER L.
POL'Y 303, 330 (2012) ("[D]isregarding the power imbalance between the police officer
and the citizen gives the former more power.").
102 Professor Wayne LaFave has suggested that the message of Hodari D. is that when
they chase a person on a wild and unsupported hunch, a "fat cop" is preferable to one
who is "slim, trim, and of athletic build," because the latter officer is too likely to catch
up to the suspect and grab him "by the scruff of the neck before the [contraband is]
ditched." Wayne R. LaFave, PinguitudinousPolice, PachydermatousPrey: Whence Fourth
Amendment "Seizures"?, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 729, 730-31.
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context. First, what constitutes "physical force" when the tactics
involved include deployment of noxious gases and audio disturbances?
Second, what constitutes "actual submission" to a show of authority
commanding persons not to submit but to go away?
To the first question, courts have repeatedly (and correctly) held that
individuals directly targeted and hit with chemical agents like mace and
pepper spray have been seized under HodariD.'s physical touching rule,
because the direct deployment of these chemical munitions is no less an
intended use of physical force than the firing of a bullet into a body.1 03
But it is unclear what the result would be in large crowds where a
bystander next to an intended pepper spray target also is hit. Similarly
uncertain are situations where pepper balls, tear gas canisters, and flash
bang grenades are fired indiscriminately into crowds without any
particular intended target. The Court's current formulation of "seizure"
requires "means intentionally applied,"104 but does that also require an
intentionally selected target? In the case of the bystander accidentally
struck, she likely is out of luck. The Court has routinely held that
persons collaterally injured by officers during the pursuit of a suspect
have not been seized because there was no intentional touching.1 05 But
for the assembled group subjected to gaseous agents, clearly the officers
intend to hit someone, even if the target is no one demonstrator in
particular. After all, tear gas only works to disperse a crowd if the gas
actually touches and irritates the crowd. Does this desire to physically
touch a group of people give the entire group of tear gas-affected
persons a Fourth Amendment claim under Hodari D.?
Adjudicating that difficult question turns on the even more vexing
issue of when someone has been "touched" by crowd control tactics.
Rubber bullets and other projectiles present relatively easy cases; the
bullets hit you or they do not. But in the case of gases, at least one court
distinguished between a group of protesters on the front lines of a
demonstration and who were directly sprayed with tear gas canisters
from a group farther back in the crowd over whom the noxious agent
merely "wafted." 106 While both groups were affected by the gas (albeit
to varying degrees), the court found that the "waft class" had not been

103 See, e.g., Ludwig v. Anderson, 54 F.3d 465, 471 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that a
seizure occurred where officers maced a suspect and hit him with a squad car).
104 Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 249 (2007).
105 See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 865 (1986) (holding that a driver
of a motorcycle was not seized when an officer accidentally struck her during a highspeed pursuit).
106 See Lamb v. City of Decatur, 947 F. Supp. 1261, 1264 (C.D. 111. 1996); see also
Paradis, supra note 20, at 334.
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seized under the Fourth Amendment.1 07 And if determining how many
molecules of a chemical gas must physically touch a protester to
constitute a seizure seems difficult, try assessing what amount of
soundwaves from a police acoustic device must "touch" the ears of a
protester to trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny.10 8
In one sense, the absurdity of these distinctions, driven as much by
ever-innovating police weaponry labs as by HodariD.'s artificial physical
touch rule, is the stuff of creative law school exam hypotheticals. In
another sense, the meaning of "physical touch" could not be more
crucial to protester Fourth Amendment claims, because the "anomaly"
of Hodari D. suggests that any touching - even wafting - should
trigger constitutional review.1 09 As one commentator observed, "Hodari
D. drastically limited seizure by a show of authority, but it may also
have had the effect of expanding the definition of seizure by physical
force."1 0 Thus, "[allthough Hodari D. is clearly not on its face
concerned with expanding either the category of physical force or the
protection that attaches to that category, its express language opens a
door to that expansion.""'
It appeared increasingly possible, however, that even this door to an
expanded seizure definition may have been closing. At least two circuit
courts of appeal, the Tenth Circuit" 2 and the D.C. Circuit," 3 held that
the use of physical force to detain a suspect does not constitute a seizure
unless that seizure is actually successful. In Torres v. Madrid,"4 the
Tenth Circuit determined that "an officer's intentional shooting of a
suspect [did] not effect a seizure" because the suspect "managed to
elude police for at least a full day after being shot.""5 The Tenth Circuit

Lamb, 947 F. Supp. at 1265.
See, e.g., Edrei v. City of New York, 254 F. Supp. 3d 565, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)
(assessing whether the use of a loud, amplified acoustic device to disperse by police to
disperse protesters constitutes force).
109 See DRESSLER, supra note 31, at 119 ("[I]f an officer barely touches the subject in
an effort to detain her, and she immediately escapes, such 'laying on of hands' is a
seizure .... ").
110 Paradis, supra note 20, at 318 (italics added); see also Ronald J. Bacigal, The Right
of the People to Be Secure, 82 KY. L.J. 145, 161-62 (1994).
111 Paradis, supra note 20, at 318 (italics added).
112 Torres v. Madrid, 769 Fed. App'x 654, 657 (10th Cir. 2019), vacated, 141 S. Ct.
989 (2021).
113 Henson v. United States, 55 A.3d 859, 862 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
114 769 Fed. App'x 654 (10th Cir. 2019).
115 Id. at 657. The Author contributed to an amicus brief on behalf of Petitioner
Roxanne Torres arguing that the Tenth Circuit's ruling contradicts the clear holding of
Hodari D. that physical touch alone constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
107
108
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acknowledged the clear language in Hodari D. suggesting otherwise but
dismissed it as common law dicta.1 16 Similarly, in Henson v. United
States," 7 the D.C. Circuit found that an officer who physically grabbed
but "did not succeed in stopping the suspect" had not effectuated a
seizure, dismissing as constitutionally irrelevant HodariD.'s "historical,
common law definition of seizure."11 8 The Eighth,11 9 Ninth, 2 0 and
Eleventh 12 1 Circuits and the New Mexico Supreme Court 22 held
otherwise, and the United States Supreme Court resolved the split in
early 2021, finding by a 5-3 vote in Torres that "[t]he application of
physical force to the body of a person with intent to restrain is a seizure,
even if the force does not succeed in subduing the person." 123 Yet the
narrowness of the Court's opinion in Torres, coupled with the fact that
even one circuit could reject Fourth Amendment application to
someone intentionally shot by police in hot pursuit does not bode well
for demonstrators indiscriminately hit with tear gas.
In the absence of physical force alone, then, it is unclear what must a
protester do to demonstrate "actual submission" sufficient to trigger the
Fourth Amendment. No case has directly addressed when the requisite
"submission to authority" occurs.1 24 However, Brendlin provides dictum
on the subject in the context of a traffic stop, finding that the passenger
of a car "was seized from the moment ... [the] car came to a halt on
116 See id.
117

55 A.3d 859 (D.C. Cir. 2012).

118 Id. at 864.
119 Ludwig v. Anderson, 54 F.3d 465, 471 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting that a seizure is
"'effected by the slightest application of physical force' despite later escape").
120 Nelson v. City of Davis, 685 F.3d 867, 876 n.4 (9th Cir. 2012) ("Even in the
absence of . . . submission, the government's intentional application of force . . . was
sufficient constitute a seizure.").
121 Carr v. Tatangelo, 338 F.3d 1259, 1268 (11th Cir. 2003) ("Although [Defendant]
was not immediately stopped by the bullet from Officer Fortson's gun, he nevertheless
was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when the bullet struck or
contacted him.").
122 State v. Garcia, 217 P.3d 1032, 1038 (N.M. 2009) ("Defendant demonstrated that
he was seized by showing that he was pepper sprayed, regardless of his subjective
reaction.").
123 Torres, 141 S. Ct. at 1003 ("The rule we announce today is narrow. In addition
to the requirement of intent to restrain, a seizure by force - absent submission - lasts
only as long as the application of force.").
124 See DRESSLER, supra note 31, at 119 ("Has a fleeing suspect, for example,
submitted to authority ... as soon as she stops running, or only when she indicates by
words or action . . . that she has submitted? Or, when does the driver of a car, ordered
to pull over on the highway, submit to authority? Is it as soon as the driver sees the
officer's red lights flashing in the rear view mirror, slows down, and begins to change
lanes to pull over, or only when the vehicle comes to a complete stop?").
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the side of the road."1 25 The analogy to protest policing is not exact,
because police in crowd control mode often neither want to nor can
detain protesters, unlike detained vehicle passengers. But if the moment
of seizure becomes not when the red lights flash in the rearview mirror
or when the car begins to slow down, but when it comes to a complete
halt as desired by the highway patrol officer, one can fairly extrapolate
for the retreating protester. 126 In the absence of detention, retreating in
response to a bullhorn command to fall back behind a certain line would
appear to demonstrate a sufficient submission when, and only when,
the protester is behind the desired line. In other words, a retreating
demonstrator from Lafayette Square Park may fairly be said to have
successfully submitted to the "show of authority" assault on their
peaceful demonstration only after having left the area, and not before.
But this conclusion yet again rests on the notion that a "not free to stay"
fact pattern can constitute a seizure in the same way as a "not free to
leave" fact pattern, a doubtful proposition under the Court's current
narrow seizure formulation.
C.

A Restraint on Liberty Theory of Seizure

The foregoing discussion highlights the Supreme Court's artificially
narrow, bifurcated, and increasingly impractical definition of "seizure."
The Court's refusal to recognize broad categories of egregious, excessive
uses of force as triggering Fourth Amendment scrutiny creates a
dangerous zone of impunity for officers. This concern applies with
particular salience in the context of protest policing, where vicious
crowd control techniques escape constitutional scrutiny. The events of
the past year confirmed Justice Stevens' fears in his Hodari D. dissent,
when he warned that, although "[iit is too early to know the
consequences of . .. [this] holding. If carried to its logical conclusion,
it will encourage unlawful displays of force that will frighten countless
innocent citizens into surrendering whatever . . . rights they may still
have." 127
It is time for a reimagined seizure definition, one that not only
promotes "the goal of deterring police misconduct," 128 but which more
125 Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 263 (2007).
126 See, e.g., Davila v. N. Reg'l Joint Police Bd., No. 2:13-cv-070, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 43702, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2016) ("[Pleople are 'seized' when pulled over
for traffic stops.").
127 California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 646-47 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128 Karen J. Pita Loor, supra note 73, at 839 (describing the Hodari D. dissent as
criticizing the majority's narrowing of the definition of seizure as "inconsistent with the
goal of deterring police misconduct because it determined whether the Fourth
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importantly accords with the fundamental liberty rationale underlying
the Fourth Amendment. The historical purpose of the Amendment was
not only to protect the privacy of individuals from the oppressive
intrusion of general warrants, but also to protect citizens' from
unwarranted government coercion and force. 129 Where protection from
unreasonable searches was premised on the fundamental precept of
privacy from a snooping government, protection from unreasonable
seizures was premised on the equally fundamental precept of liberty
from a violent government.130
By refocusing seizures as restraints on liberty rather than technical
touching or total submission, a few practical things occur. First, any
police-directed restraint on physical movement becomes a seizure,
whether that restraint takes the form of a criminal suspect unable to
leave or an assembled mass of demonstrators unable to proceed. This
approach readily accords with the historical, constitutional
understanding of a seizure separate and apart from any common law
definition more akin to an arrest. It also, admittedly, opens the door to
constitutional scrutiny of potentially large swaths of routine police
conduct. But that is a good thing. The Supreme Court's much-maligned
Fourth Amendment search law jurisprudence suffers from a series of
tortured legal fictions that label conduct that is factually a "search"

Amendment applied to the interaction based on how the civilian responded, not on how
the police behaved"); see also Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 646 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The
deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule focus on the conduct of law enforcement
officers and on discouraging improper behavior on their part, and not on the reaction
of the citizen to the show of force.").
129 The most frequently articulated historical purposes of the Fourth Amendment
involve freedom from unreasonable searches. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 463 (1928) (stating the "well-known historical purpose" of the Fourth
Amendment "was to prevent the use of governmental force to search a man's house, his
person, his papers, and his effects, and to prevent their seizure against his will."); cf.
Brandon R. Teachout, On Originalism's Originality: The Supreme Court's Historical
Analysis of the Fourth Amendment from Boyd to Carpenter, 55 TULSA L. REV. 63,86 (2019)
(noting that this declaration was made "without citation to any historical sources"). But
this historical purpose "also supports [a] reading of the Fourth Amendment's purpose
as reflecting a protection against 'personal security."' Jonathan Ostrowsky, #MeToo's
Unseen Frontier: Law Enforcement's Sexual Misconduct and the Fourth Amendment
Response, 67 UCLA L. REV. 258, 290 (2020) ("The Fourth Amendment imposes limits
...
to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the
privacy and personal security of individuals." (quoting United States v. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976))).
130 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 5-7, United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259
(1997) (No. 95-1717) ("IW]hy is not any offensive touching a violation of the act? ...
IT]he idea of the Fourth Amendment does go way, way back ... of any invasion of a
person's personal security.").
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legally inadequate in an inconsistent effort to narrow the search
threshold.1 31 A much simpler and more principled way to proceed
would be to call a search a search and then assess its reasonableness.
So, too, should the Court proceed with its seizure jurisprudence.
Defining a larger scope of police conduct a "seizure" does not declare it
unlawful; it merely subjects it to a constitutional reasonableness
calculus, one which recent Court history suggests will tilt heavily in
favor of the officer.1 32 Thus, declaring it a seizure when an officer
commands a pedestrian to cross the street to avoid a crime scene does
not unnecessarily open the floodgates of litigation. Instead, it merely
provides an opportunity to confirm the eminent reasonableness of that
officer's conduct in the rare case where the pedestrian sees fit to waste
their time with such a suit. More importantly, additional constitutional
scrutiny of police use of force is sorely needed, especially for a Court
that has "abdicated" its responsibilities on that front.1 33
Second, a restraint on liberty theory of seizure does away with the
artificial and increasingly unworkable physical touch and show of
authority distinctions. This has several benefits. This artificial
distinction, if taken to its logical conclusion, arguably compels a finding
of seizure if an officer attempts a stop by placing a gentle hand on a
target's back but not if the officer shouts profanity-laced commands at
and threatens violence towards an unrelenting target. Eliminating the
distinction eliminates these nonsensical contrary results. It also
131 See, e.g., Sherry F. Colb, What is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth
Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 121 (2002) ("In
some recent decisions that recognize and leave open the possibility of broader Fourth
Amendment protection, the Court displays ambivalence about the moves it has
repeatedly employed and thereby calls into question the logical moves and doctrinal
conclusions embraced by the earlier precedents."); Orin S. Kerr, An EquilibriumAdjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 479 (2011)
("Scholars complain that the law is 'a mess,' 'an embarrassment,' and 'a mass of
contradictions."'); Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman"'s FourthAmendment: Privacy or Mutual
Distrust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1753 (1994)
("Consequently, most arguments have coalesced along the lines that the Court has not
properly measured the individual's expectations of privacy, that it has underemphasized
the Warrant Clause's requirements of a warrant based on probable cause, or that it has
struck the wrong balance of individual and government interests in deciding that a
particular intrusion was 'reasonable."').
132 See Tonja Jacobi & Ross Berlin, Supreme Irrelevance: The Court's Abdication in
Criminal Procedure Jurisprudence, 51 UC DAVis L. REV, 2033, 2036 (2018) ("The
Supreme Court has largely abdicated any role in regulating police stops that do not
produce evidence of criminality .... ").
133 Id. ("Despite doubling its criminal procedure caseload, the United States Supreme
Court has failed to address the most significant issues that have accompanied the rise
of the modern criminal justice system.").
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removes quantum physics from the Court's list of responsibilities, as it
no longer must adjudicate whether a diffuse chemical gas or soundwave
"physically touched" a demonstrator. Perhaps most importantly,
removing the distinction in a restraint on liberty theory recognizes the
practical power imbalance between officer and citizen and the attendant
ability of nonphysical, assertive shows of authority to chasten and
restrain targets of that conduct, including protesters.
II.

PROTESTS AND FOURTH AMENDMENT STANDING

In July 2020, Acting Homeland Security Secretary Chad Wolf
authorized the deployment of thousands of secretive federal police to
Portland, Oregon, ostensibly to protect federal property from vandalism
by increasingly violent crowds of protesters. 3 4 Dressed in combat
fatigues, armed with tear gas and flash bang grenades, and lacking any
identifying insignia other than the word "POLICE" emblazoned across
their backs, shadowy federal agents from at least six different agencies
began confronting protesters in downtown Portland on July 12, 2020.135
Pursuant to Wo's public statements, the police's stated mission was to
protect the Mark O. Hatfield United States Courthouse, which had
become the focal point of protesters and the site of widespread property
damage. 13 6

134 Kristine Phillips, Acting DHS Secretary ChadWolf: FederalOfficers in Portland'Are
Not the Gestapo, Storm Troopers, or Thugs', USA TODAY (Aug. 6, 2020, 8:42 AM ET),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/08/06/dhs-secretary-chad-wolftestifies-federal-agents-portland/5580507002/ [https://perma.cc/2DE4-X3GL].
135 Kyron J. Huigens, Trump's Legal Justification for the Abduction of Portland
Protesters Is Absurd, SLATE (July 20, 2020, 4:48 PM), https://slate.com/news-andlhttps-/perma.cc/
poitics/2020/07/trump-legal-justification-portland-secret-police.html
2393-H5XZ] ("Last week, people wearing combat fatigues were seen pulling apparently
peaceful protesters off the streets . . . and hustling them into unmarked vehicles. Their
uniforms carried no identifying insignia, but they were clearly military uniforms.");
Kristofer Rios, Marjorie McAfee, Neil Giardino, Zoe Lake, John Kapetaneas & Anthony
Rivas, Legality of FederalAgents in PortlandScrutinized as ProtestsBecome More Violent,
ABC NEWS (July 22, 2020, 1:18 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/legality-federal-agentsportland-scrutinized-protests-violent/story?id=71908246 [httpsJ/perma.cc/VT3Z-8JTV].
136 Dave Goldiner, Homeland Security Chief Boasts of 'Proactively' Rounding Up
Protesters as Crackdown Widens, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (July
22, 2020),
httpsJ/www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/ny-chad-wolf-proactive-homeland-securitylhttps://perma.cc/E97T-66G7]
20200722-66sn2apavnc2tfbzi3anwctzee-story.html
(quoting Wolf's description of his agency's blatantly unconstitutional tactics during a
Fox News interview: "We are having to go out and proactively arrest individuals").
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It soon became clear that the federal agents' primary purpose was to
suppress peaceful protests by any means necessary. 137 Viral video
footage showed federal police lobbing tear gas, grenades, and other
chemical munitions at peaceful protesters, including a line of "Portland
Moms" that included visibly pregnant women. 138 Officers pepper
sprayed and repeatedly beat a 53 year-old Navy veteran when he
approached with his hands up to ask a question. 139 They sprayed rubber
bullets into a crowd, hitting multiple protesters and causing skull
fractures in at least two cases.140 At one point, video footage appeared
to show officers targeting and detaining journalists with visible press
credentials.1 41 Perhaps most troubling, dozens of individuals reported
being forcibly removed from the street, placed into unmarked rental
cars, placed under arrest and put in a holding cell inside the Hatfield
Federal Courthouse. These individuals were later released without
notification of their charges or the identity of their captors by name or
agency, and without any record of their arrest.142

137 Hamed Aleaziz, "Disturbingand Demoralizing": DHS Employees Are Worried the
Portland Protest Response Is Destroying Their Agency's Reputation, BUZZFEED (July 21,
2020, 7:02 PM ET), httpsJ/www.buzzfeednews.com/article/hamedaleaziz/dhs-employee(quoting DHS
[https://perma.cc/3XHN-EFB3]
anger-over-portland-protest-response
employee: "This administration's utterly transparent fearmongering of sending federal
officers out against peaceful protesters in Portland and Chicago has no purpose other
than to support Trump's reelection bid. It is blatantly unconstitutional and an
embarrassment to the agency and the career civil servants who work here").
138 Huigens, supra note 135 ("Over the weekend, a group of Portland, Oregon moms
confronted federal officers who had fired tear gas at them and other peaceful protesters
on Saturday outside a federal courthouse."); Ryan Mac, A Group of Moms Formed a
Human Wall to ProtectPortlandProtestersfrom FederalOfficers, BUZZFEED (July 19, 2020,
7:43 PM ET), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/moms-human-wallportland-protest-federal-officers [https://perma.cc/ZS5D-AUKL].
139 Navy Veteran Beaten by FederalAgents in Portland 'They Came Out to Fight', L.A.
TIMES (July 20, 2020, 7:43 PM PT), https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/202007-20/navy-vet-beaten-by-federal-agents-they-came-out-to-fight [https://perma.cc/46HV-

ZDZ7].
140 Ryan Nguyen, Police Shoot PortlandProtesterin Head with Impact Weapon, Causing
Severe Injuries, OREGONIAN (July 12, 2020), https://www.oregonlive.com/news/2020/07/
police-shoot-portland-protester-in-head-with-impact-weapon-causing-severe-injuries.
html [https://perma.cc/J3LY-4T4B].
141

Tucker Higgins,Judge Blocks FederalOfficers from TargetingJournalistsin Portland

Anti-racism Protests, CNBC (uly 24, 2020, 9:14 AM EDT), https://www.cnbc.com/
2020/07/24/judge-blocks-federal-officers-from-targeting-journalists-in-portland.html
[https://perma.cc/5ZG9-B7Z7].
142 Katie Shepherd & Mark Berman, 'It Was Like Being Preyed Upon': Portland
ProtestersSay Federal Officers in Unmarked Vans Are Detaining Them, WASH. POST (uly
17, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation2020/07/17/portland-protests-federalarrests/[https://perma.cc/665V-GKW8].
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These "disappearances" by unidentified government troops shocked
observers, who remarked on their reminiscence to authoritarian
regimes quelling dissent. 143 One of these observers, Oregon Attorney
General Ellen Rosenblum, responded by suing numerous federal
agencies, including Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), the
U.S. Marshals Service, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the
Federal Protection Service.1 44 In requesting injunctive relief to "stop the
federal police from secretly stopping and forcibly grabbing Oregonians
off the street," Attorney General Rosenblum personally asserted
standing to appear for Oregon "citizens under the doctrine of parens
patriae," as the protector of her state's citizens.1 45 On the same day, the
ACLU filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of journalists and legal
observers seeking an injunction to prevent DHS and the U.S. Marshals

-

service "from assaulting news reporters" and using "unconstitutionally
excessive force," including "riot batons, semi-lethal projectiles, and
chemical weapons." 146 Both complaints brought Fourth Amendment
excessive force claims, among other causes of action.
Are either of these representative actions a proper exercise of
standing? While those Oregonians personally detained or forcibly
dispersed may have personal standing to seek redress, these lawsuits
as well as a third parens patriaesuit filed against the NYPD on January
14, 2021, by New York Attorney General Letitia James for their protest

raise the interesting and
policing practices last summer1 47 increasingly important question of whether such representative actions

143 Mike Baker, Thomas Fuller & Sergio Olmos, Federal Agents Push into Portland
Streets, Stretching Limits of Their Authority, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/25/us/portland-federal-legal-jurisdiction-courts.html
[https://perma.cc/J9FX-HNW5] (quoting an attorney and member of the Portland "Wall
of Moms" as saying, "This is not creeping authoritarianism. The authoritarianism is
here").
144 See Rosenblum v. Does 1-10, 474 F. Supp. 3d 1128, 1130 (D. Or. 2020); see also
Complaint, supra note 27, at 2-3.
145 Attorney General Rosenblum Files Lawsuit Against U.S. Homeland Security;
Announces Criminal Investigation, OR. DEP'T OF JUST. (July 17, 2020) httpsl/www.doj.
state.or.us/media-home/news-media-releases/attorney-general-rosenblum-files-lawsuit[https://perma.cc/
against-u-s-homeland-security-announces-criminal-investigation/
H9FY-8N3L]; Complaint, supra note 27, at 3.
146 Index Newspapers LLC v. City of Portland, No. 3:20-cv-1035-SI, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 127214, at *2-3 (D. Or. July 17, 2020); see also Second Amended Complaint,
supra note 26, at 1, 24.

147 State of New York v. City of New York, No. 1:21-cv-0322, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
81329, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2021); see also Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief, supra note 27, at 3.
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are appropriate in the protest policing context, or permissible at all
under the Fourth Amendment.
Fourth Amendment scholars may intuitively answer "no." The
Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that Fourth
Amendment rights are personal and may not be asserted vicariously,
applying an exceedingly narrow construction of Fourth Amendment
"standing" to reject claims even when the petitioners clearly suffered
substantial personal injury from illegal police conduct. 4 8 It would seem
particularly strange, then, to recognize vicarious state standing to bring
such claims. Moreover, the Fourth Amendment's text and precedent
relies on individualized fact-specific inquiries of what constitutes
"reasonable suspicion," "probable cause," or "objectively reasonable use
of force," each adjudged by a totality-of-the-circumstances standard.1 49
As a result, common facts and issues rarely predominate, meaning
Fourth Amendment class actions rarely survive Rule 23 class
certification. 150

These intuitions are reasonable, but they may not be correct in the
protest policing context. Singular, unified command decisions to
violently disperse a large crowd of demonstrators may provide the one
excessive force context where a single judgment about the
reasonableness of a single seizure could be made on a class wide basis.
Moreover, states acting in their quasi-sovereign parens patriae capacity
may be able to survive standing challenges if they can show a
sufficiently widespread pattern or practice of constitutional violations
against their citizens, though the very limited case law considering that
question is mixed. 51 The "Operation Legend" mission also presents the

148 Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778 (2014) (denying that presence of an
innocent passenger in a car is relevant to an argument that "too many shots were fired"
by officers to detain suspect driver, because "the question before us is whether
petitioner's violated Rickard's Fourth Amendment rights, not [the passenger's]"); Rakas
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978) ("Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights
which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted." (quoting
Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 230 (1973), questioning whether a separate
Fourth Amendment "standing" doctrine exists at all)).
149 See Nirej Sekhon, Mass Suppression:Aggregation and the Fourth Amendment, 51
GA. L. REV. 429, 432 (2017) (describing difficulties in aggregating typical Fourth
Amendment claims).
150 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) (authorizing class actions only if "there are questions
of law or fact common to the class"); Garrett, supra note 34, at 620.
151 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517-21 (2007) (discussing
Massachusetts's ability to sue in a quasi-sovereign capacity to compel a reduction in
greenhouse gases); cf. Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1186 (9th Cir. 2017)
("The States may not sue the federal government as parens patriae to protect their
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complicating factor that states generally may not sue the federal
government in its parens patriaecapacity, though a narrow exception to
this rule may in fact authorize claims challenging specific protest
policing conduct.1 52
This Section explores these questions, beginning with a brief
overview of the vagaries of Fourth Amendment "standing" doctrine
before turning to aggregate standing and state standing.
A.

Seizures and Standing

Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution requires that all claims heard
in federal court present a "case" or "controversy."1 53 To establish the
existence of a case or controversy, litigants must demonstrate that they
have "standing."1 54 Under the now-familiar tests of Article III standing,
plaintiffs must establish that they have suffered an "injury in fact[,]"
that is "an invasion of a legally protected interest" which is concrete,
particularized, and actual or imminent.1 55 The injury must be "fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant" and it must be
"likely, as opposed to merely speculative" that a favorable decision will
redress the harm. 156 These standing requirements are jurisdictional.
Courts do not have authority to adjudicate claims brought by litigants
who cannot show standing.1 57
These rules also broadly mean that, normally, litigants can only assert
their own legal rights and interests. They cannot seek remedies based
on violations of the rights or interests of absent third parties.1 58 Thus,
standing doctrine "requires [courts] to separate injured from
ideological plaintiffs."15 9 Courts and scholars have articulated a number
citizens from constitutional violations alleged to have been committed by the federal
government.").
152 See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923); see also infra Part

III.C.
153 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)
("[T]he core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-orcontroversy requirement of Article III.").
154 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
155 Id.; see also In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 632
(3d Cir. 2017).
156 Payton v. Cnty. of Kane, 308 F.3d 673, 677 (7th Cir. 2002).
157

Id.

158 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (explaining general rule that federal

courts will not allow a plaintiff to assert the rights and interests of absent third parties).
159 Seth Davis, The New Public Standing, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1229, 1238-39 (2019)
("Ideological plaintiffs, who allege nothing more than a 'special interest' in the subject
of their suit, lack standing. . . . By contrast, individuals and private entities may sue to
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of justifications for these stringent, personalized standing requirements.
They assure concrete,
adversarial litigation, guard against
constitutionally impermissible advisory opinions, avoid stare decisis
issues if absent third parties do not regard themselves as bound by the
results, and more broadly, they further an appropriate separation of
powers. 160
In addition to establishing standing under Article III, litigants raising
Fourth Amendment claims must articulate a personally held substantive
right under the Fourth Amendment. Before Rakas v. Illinois,161 this
requirement was commonly referred to as Fourth Amendment
"standing."1 62 In Rakas, the Court rejected the notion that the Fourth
Amendment imposed separate standing requirements but reaffirmed
that only individuals whose personal "reasonable expectation of
privacy" was violated had Fourth Amendment claims to assert.1 63 In
denying an automobile passenger standing to challenge an unlawful
search of the glove box of the car, the Rakas Court held that, to press a
Fourth Amendment claim, a litigant must demonstrate that the
government has intruded upon her personal reasonable expectations of
privacy.1 64 Because "Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights," the
Court held that they "may not be vicariously asserted." 165
In reaching this holding, the Rakas Court rejected the proposition
that being the "target" of investigative searches or seizures
automatically confers standing to challenge the constitutionality of
those searches or seizures.1 66 Targets of investigations may suffer
intrusions upon their expectations of privacy, and those who suffer
intrusions upon their expectations of privacy may be targets.1 67

.

vindicate financial injuries, which have been called the 'paradigmatic' type of injury ..
[T]he loss of even of a 'few pennies' is enough to give a litigant standing in an Article
III court .... ").
160

See Gray, supra note 30, at 87.

161 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
162 Gray, supra note 30, at 88.
163
164

Rahas, 439 U.S. at 134.
Id. at 140.

165 Id. at 133-34 (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)) ("A
person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction
of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has
not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed.")).
166 Id. at 132-33 ("Adoption of the so-called 'target' theory advanced by petitioners
would in effect permit a defendant to assert that a violation of the Fourth Amendment
rights of a third party entitled him to have evidence suppressed at his trial.").
167 See id. at 134; see also Nadia B. Soree, The Demise of Fourth Amendment Standing:
From Standing Room to Center Orchestra, 8 NEV. LJ. 570, 598 (2008) (criticizing the
differential treatment of these two sets of injured persons).
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However, being a target is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish
eligibility to raise a Fourth Amendment claim.1 68 It therefore made no
sense, in the Court's view, to confer automatic standing to targets.
Instead, the Court advised that the question of standing is determined
solely by whether the litigant's reasonable expectations of privacy were
violated.1 69 In other words, police can unlawfully seize evidence to use
against a suspect (the target), but if the suspect had no protectable
privacy interest in the place searched or the thing seized (e.g., the police
ransack the neighbor's house), then the suspect's injury is insufficient
to confer standing.
Unlike limited exceptions to Article III standing requirements
authorizing vicarious standing claims jus tertii, post-Rakas precedent
confirms that no such exception exists allowing litigants to raise Fourth
Amendment claims on behalf of absent third parties.1 70 This exceedingly
strict application of Rakas has led to manifestly unjust results. For
example, in United States v. Payner,171 Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
agents investigated American citizens suspected of hiding income in
offshore banks.17 2 Frustrated by a lack of progress in their investigation,
agents conspired to steal banking records from an employee of one of
the suspect banks. 7 3 When the banker was in the United States on
business, the agents arranged a date for him.1 74 While he was out on the
town, an investigator, working for the agents, stole the banker's
briefcase.1 75 IRS agents copied the contents of the stolen briefcase,
76
which included documents showing Payner's efforts to hide income.1
Importantly, the entire scheme was approved by IRS supervisors and inhouse counsel because they knew that Payner would not have
"standing" to raise any Fourth Amendment objections because the

168 See Rakas, 429 U.S. at 138-39.
169 See id. at 148; see also Julian A. Cook III, Policing in the Era of Permissiveness:
Mitigating Misconduct Through Third-Party Standing, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1144-45
(2016) (criticizing Rahas as part of a pattern of creating unreviewable categories of
police misconduct).
170 See Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398,409-13 (2013) (denying standing
to American journalists and activists whose private communications were discovered
by agents through surveillance of non-U.S. persons located abroad).
171

172
173

447 U.S. 727 (1980).
Id. at 729.
Id. at 730.

174 Id.
175 Id.
176

Id.
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stolen briefcase did not belong to him. 177 At trial, Payner moved to
suppress evidence gathered during the search.1 78 The trial court was
"appalled by the agents' behavior and the institutional approval of their
activities provided by supervisors and attorneys," and granted Payner
standing.1 79
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the bank employee was the
only person with standing to raise a Fourth Amendment claim because
only his - and not the defendant's - reasonable expectation of privacy
had been violated. 180 Thus, Payner could not assert the banker's claim
vicariously, nor could the nonparty banker enter the case to seek
suppression of the evidence on Payner's behalf.181 That holding "not
only allowed the government to exploit a premeditated violation of the
Fourth Amendment, it also issued an effective license for government
agents to adopt similar strategies in the future."1 82
However, this cramped and dangerous doctrine of Fourth
Amendment "standing" has developed almost exclusively in cases
challenging police searches like in Rakas and Payner. Virtually no major
cases have considered Fourth Amendment "standing" requirements in
unreasonable seizure cases.1 83 In one respect, this precedential gap
makes sense. Unlike searches, which often happen to places and things
and lead to queries about who has a privacy interest in those places and
things, seizures happen to people. A person who is unreasonably seized
- either via prolonged detention, warrantless arrest, or excessive force
- likely has no trouble establishing a personal, as opposed to vicarious,
injury.
In another sense, however, an identical "standing" conundrum exists
in these seizure cases. Unless the individual unreasonably seized is a
party to the action (i.e., the criminal defendant), they have no standing

177 See id.; see also id. at 738 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Th[is] holding effectively
turns the standing rules created by this Court for assertions of Fourth Amendment
violations into a sword to be used by the Government to permit it deliberately to invade
one person's Fourth Amendment rights in order to obtain evidence against another
person.").

178 Id. at 729 (majority opinion).
179
(N.D.
180
181
182

Gray, supra note 30, at 91 (citing United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 131
Ohio 1977)).
See Payner, 447 U.S. at 735.
See id.
Gray, supra note 30, at 91; see also Payner, 447 U.S. at 739 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); George C. Thomas III & Barry S. Pollack, Balancing the FourthAmendment
Scales: The Bad-FaithException to Exclusionary Rule Limitations, 45 HASTINGs L.J. 21, 35
(1993) (describing the "bad-faith searches" at issue in Payner).
183 See DRESSLER, supra note 31, at 319-35.
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to pursue their Fourth Amendment claim, at least absent a separate civil
rights action. In other words, had federal agents in Payner tied up and
beaten the bank employee en route to stealing his briefcase, the
employee would have lacked the ability to assert his rights in an action
to which he was not a party. Likewise, the criminal defendant likewise
would have lacked the ability to assert vicarious standing. Alternatively,
the banker may have elected to protect his Fourth Amendment interests
via a civil rights lawsuit, which may be worth the time and expense
depending on the severity of the injuries. But in other cases, including
those with mass seizures and relatively minor injuries, individual
lawsuits may neither be possible nor preferable. Thus, to the extent a
post-Rakas Fourth Amendment allows, other litigation vehicles may
need to be pursued. It is to these representative vehicles we now turn.
B.

Aggregate Standing

An individual whose person is seized by an officer automatically
crosses the Fourth Amendment threshold and has standing to challenge
that action.184 Unlike the "target versus zone of privacy holder" thicket
search cases present, in seizure cases there almost always exists a
synchronicity between the seized party and the injured party. The
trickier standing question for seizure cases is what happens when
groups are seized en masse, as in the case of assembled crowds of
protesters. Each individual seized protester has standing to proceed, but
a few practical realities often preclude meritorious individual seizure
litigation from moving forward. First, unlike search cases, which
inevitably arise in the context of a motion to suppress in a criminal
proceeding, "[p]olice use of excessive force rarely gives rise to evidence
. . as a result, few excessive force claims are litigated in the context of
the exclusionary rule."1 85 Lacking an existing legal proceeding,
government-appointed counsel, and a constitutional remedy, most
victims of police brutality must proceed with complex, costly, and risky
civil rights litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.186 Second, most victims of
police violence "lack the resources to navigate the federal court system,
and if the case gets to trial,"1 87 - a doubtful proposition given the near
184 United States v. Sanford, 806 F.3d 954, 958-59 (7th Cir. 2015) ("[E]ven if [a car
passenger] lacks standing to challenge the search on the basis of having a quasi-property
right of some sort in the car, he has standing to challenge the seizure of his person .... ").
185 Paradis, supra note 20, at 328.
186 See Barbara E. Armacost, OrganizationalCulture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 453, 472 (2004) (noting that "the sheer volume of factual evidence that
is necessary to make out such a [claim] makes cases very expensive to litigate").
187 Paradis, supra note 20, at 328.
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absolute immunity provided by modern qualified immunity
jurisprudence1 88 - "it will be the word of the uniformed officer against
that of the plaintiff, often poor, badly educated, and [possibly] a
criminal himself."1 89

-

These practical barriers to relief do not affect the legal standing
inquiry. But they do beg for an alternative legal vehicle, which may exist
in the case of mass protest seizures. Aggregate class action treatment of
such claims could provide access to protest plaintiffs with little
resources and comparatively smaller claims, and more importantly, may
provide the only realistic opportunity to deter and sanction
indiscriminate violent crowd control techniques.
However, the structure of the Fourth Amendment makes such
aggregate treatment difficult. Fourth Amendment standing inquiries are
so individualized in part because the constitutional text itself calls for
fact-specific, individualized inquiries regarding the scope of
protection.1 90 The two touchstones of Fourth Amendment inquiry
reasonableness and probability - inherently call for contextualized
analysis rather than the adoption of bright-line rules. "For example, the
concept of 'probable cause' implies an individualized question whether
a particular search or seizure was reasonable under the
circumstances." 19 1 The Supreme Court's totality-of-the circumstances
approach to probable cause determinations reflects this individualized
inquiry.1 92 Likewise, Terry stops analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment's Reasonableness Clause1 93 require a determination of

188 See Fields, supra note 10, at 982; see also Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified
Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 235 (2006) (noting that "absolute immunity and qualified
immunity are supposed to operate in very different ways," even if they often do not in
the police context, because "qualified immunity turns on the objective reasonableness
of the official's conduct in light of existing constitutional doctrine").
189 Paradis, supra note 20, at 328.
190 See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment
imposes no irreducible requirement of individualized suspicion." (citing United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976))); see also Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. EmployeesIAM v. Vilsack, 681 F.3d 483, 499 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) ("By
establishing reasonableness as the legal test, the text of the Fourth Amendment requires
judges to engage in a common-law-like balancing of public and private interests to
determine the constitutionality of particular kinds of searches and seizures."); Vore v.
U.S. Dep't of Just., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1132 (D. Ariz. 2003) ("Whether or not a
search or seizure is reasonable is a fact-specific determination." (citing United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985))).
191 Garrett, supra note 34, at 620.
192 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (discussing the magistrate's need
to consider all of the particular circumstances of a case under the approach).
193 See Terry v. Ohio, 368 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
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"reasonable suspicion," as articulated through an assessment of all the
facts, circumstances, and rational inferences available to the officer at
the time. 194
These unique factual determinations for each officer-citizen makes
the class action vehicle an uneasy fit, as only class claims predominated
by common facts that are amenable to a single legal determination are
appropriate for aggregation.1 95 To be sure, fact-specific questions cut
short any number of class claims in all areas of law, particularly where
common issues do not predominate. For example, in the employment
context, class action requirements that all members share some degree
of commonality and typicality in their claims are relatively easy to
satisfy when a uniformly enforced blanket policy is at issue, such as an
employer's across-the-board policy of denying meal breaks or providing
miscalculated wage statements.1 96 But employment discrimination
claims can be more difficult to maintain on a class basis when their
common core claims involve patterns or practices of discrimination that
vary from member to member.1 97
This variability is almost always present in the Fourth Amendment
context. Not only are there problems of inconsistent practices across a
large group of affected purported class members, but of legal standards
governing the claims that are inherently vague and probabilistic,
requiring nuanced individualized assessment of particular actions at
particular split-second intervals. This fact-specific nature of Fourth
Amendment inquiries "tend[s] to frustrate aggregate treatment."1 98 This
functions less as a textual requirement that the Court's interpretation
that such a result is required, at least under some theories of liability.
In the Terry stop context, the Court has held that stops and frisks must
be supported by individualized reasonable suspicion, based on the
194 Id. ("Each case of this sort will, of course, have to be decided on its own facts.").
195 See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake
of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 658-59 (2012).
196 Compare Espinoza v. Domino's Pizza, LLC, No. EDCV 07-1601-VAP (OPx), 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31093, at *1, *39 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2009) (certifying class where
claims alleged employer denied meal breaks and provided intentionally miscalculated
wage statements as a matter of policy), with Lampe v. Queen of the Valley Med. Ctr.,
228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 279, 292 (2018) (denying certification where employer had policy of
providing meal breaks and there was varying evidence among class members regarding
waivers).
197 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 352 (2011) ("Here
respondents wish to sue about literally millions of employment decisions at once.
Without some glue holding the alleged reasons for all those decisions together, it will
be impossible to say that examination of all the class members' claims for relief will
produce a common answer to the crucial question why was I disfavored.").
198 Garrett, supra note 34, at 620.
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circumstances of that individual stop. 199 Likewise, probable cause
determinations require individualized assessments of split-second
decisions to determine whether a suspect may be arrested. 200 Because
each factual circumstance will differ from the officer's perspective in
that moment, courts regularly deny class certification for class claims
based on false arrest alleging aggregated constitutional seizure
violations. 2 0' Because both such cases are "seizure" cases, this alone
casts serious doubt on the ability to successfully aggregate mass protest
excessive force seizure claims.
Moreover, the Court has reaffirmed time and again that, in the
context of police use of force, no one particular police practice is per se
unconstitutional. 202 Instead, each use of force case must be examined
on the totality of the "facts and circumstances under which each search
and/or inspection took place." 203 In other words, if the Court held that
carotid chokeholds were per se unconstitutional, presumably a class of
people subjected to such practice could successfully challenge the
practice. Indeed, the rare successful Fourth Amendment class cases
involve blanket governmental policies that are deemed per se
unconstitutional, thus satisfying the commonality requirement of
certification and authorizing class relief.204 For example, in Gerstein v.
Pugh,205 former detainees brought a class action seeking to challenge a
policy of pre-trial detention without a warrant and without an
199

Terry v. Ohio, 368 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).

200 See State v. Johnson, 944 A.2d 297, 312 (Conn. 2008) (explaining that "it would

make little sense to require police officers, who are often required to make split second
decisions regarding probable cause, to adhere to the cumbersome" framework rejected
by the Supreme Court in Gates); State v. Schulz, 55 A.3d 933, 939 (N.H. 2012)
("Officers executing warrants cannot be expected to make the same [probable cause]
decision in a split second, under dangerous conditions, that a reviewing court makes
after a comprehensive review.").
201 See McCarthy v. Kleindienst, 741 F.2d 1406, 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Garrett,
supra note 34, at 621.
202 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989) (limiting the analysis only
to the circumstances as they existed in the split second before the particular force was
used).
203 Russo v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 201 F.R.D. 291, 300 (D. Conn. 2001) (citing Ker
v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963)); cf. id. ("Fourth Amendment violations may be
susceptible to resolution by means of a class action where the allegations involve a
uniform policy.").
204 See Casale v. Kelly, 257 F.R.D. 396, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Class treatment for such
a per se prohibition is analogous to, for example, a per se prohibition against arresting
people under statutes previously declared unconstitutional. See id. at 415 (certifying
class of all persons who had been or would be arrested for violation of a law declared
unconstitutional).
205 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
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opportunity for a probable cause determination by a judge. 206 This
07
"blanket policy" allowed for common claims to predominate. 2 And
unlike in excessive force cases, the Court found a categorical Fourth
Amendment violation, holding that the Constitution requires that there
be "a timely judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite
to detention," regardless of the probable cause determinations
ultimately made in each individual class member's case. 208 These types
of cases avoid the highly individualized, fact-specific treatment at odds
with the class action vehicle. Instead of relying on allegations that every
class member was unreasonably searched or seized without probable
cause, the focus is on allegations that no probable cause determination
took place at all. 209 No such categorical prohibition exists in the Court's

excessive force jurisprudence, rendering such class claims almost
always dead on arrival.
Yet despite the absence of categorical use of force prohibitions and
the reluctance of courts to aggregate individualized seizure cases, one
type of excessive force claim may still be suitable for class treatment:
ones where a single use of force was directed at and affected in
substantially similar ways a large group of people at once. In other
words, in the protest policing context, "[c]lass actions may be easier to
bring in the situation where a large group of people, say at a political
demonstration, were subjected to ... common 'command decisions to
disperse the crowd."' 2 10 Of course, different protest scenarios would
provide different levels of suitability for class treatment. The actions of
federal forces in Portland during "Operation Legend" appeared largely
206 See id. at 106-07.
207 See id.; see also Blihovde v. St. Croix Cnty., 219 F.R.D. 607, 622 (W.D. Wis. 2003)
(finding that "a class action provides the most feasible and efficient method of
determining liability" in a case where a blanket unconstitutional policy of suspicionless
strip searches affected a "potentially large number of people"); Garrett, supra note 34,
at 634.
208 Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 126; cf. In re Nassau Cnty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219,
230 (2d Cir. 2006) (certifying Fourth Amendment class action "[i]n light of the
pervasive character of the common liability issues and the admitted de minimis nature
of individualized liability issues"); Casale v. Kelly, 257 F.R.D. 396, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(discussing the court's hesitation to decertify the class with common liability issues).
209 See Garrett, supra note 34, at 621 ("The type of class action brought commonly
on behalf of arrestees relates not to whether the arrest itself was supported by probable
cause, but the situation where law enforcement adopts a 'blanket policy' that does not
make a reasonable suspicion judgment at all - such as a policy of strip-searching all
detainees regardless of whether the officers possessed reasonable suspicion .... ").
210 Id. at 620; cf. Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (questioning
suitability of class action treatment in case where plaintiffs Vietnam War protesters were
falsely arrested at the U.S. Capitol after being warned to disperse).
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to involve a series of horrifying, yet individualized decisions to target
and seize large numbers of people one at a time. 21 ' Similarly, protest
policing activities in New York City in the days after George Floyd's
murder received widespread condemnation and has become the target
of at least one suit by the New York Attorney General. 212 However, the
most egregious acts of unlawful violence - including pulling down
protective face masks to pepper spray protesters, beating kneeling
protesters with batons, and ramming a small crowd with a police SUV
- all appear to be individual decisions. 213
In contrast, the protest at Lafayette Square Park involving
premeditated command decisions to fire tear gas directly at a large
peaceful crowd immediately prior to President Trump's stroll appear
more suitable for class treatment, at least from video footage and witness
statements of the event. 214 The court would not need to make hundreds
of individualized determinations whether the mass seizure was
reasonable, but only assess whether the single command decision to tear
gas the crowd was objectively reasonable. 215 Of course, other factual
intricacies make it far from certain that even this type of singular act
leading to mass injury could survive class certification. Must all
demonstrators have been affected substantially similarly, or is a "direct
impact" and "waft class" designation necessary? Is the court limited to
a single type of seizure conduct - only tear gas or pepper balls, but not
both? Or more narrowly, a single tear gas canister? And even if these
issues could be rendered sufficiently justiciable in the aggregate, what
level of individualized inquiry is still required to resolve the question of
whether an officer was objectively justified to lob a particular canister

211 One possible exception might be the "Wall of Moms," a group of hundreds of
women all intentionally tear gassed during a single command decision outside the
Hatfield Courthouse. See Huigens, supranote 135.
212 See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 27, at 2
(suing the City of New York based on unlawful police practices during the protests in
the summer of 2020).
213 See, e.g., Cook, supra note 5 (discussing one NYPD officer who pepper sprayed a
protester in the face); Fallon, supra note 4 ("Two New York Police Department vehicles
plowed into demonstrators .... ").
214 See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
215 See Dan Friedell, Some Clarity a Day After Reports of Tear Gas in Lafayette Square,
but Questions Remain, WTOP (June 2, 2020, 9:30 PM), http://wtop.com/dc/2020/06/
some-clarity-a-day-after-reports-of-tear-gas-in-lafayette-square-but-questions-remain/
[http://perma.cc/9R9R-W5UF] (reporting that the decision to forcibly remove
protesters from the park was made by U.S. Attorney General William Barr who stated,
"This needs to be done. Get it done").
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at that exact moment? 216 Must every demonstrator's conduct in that
moment be examined? What if all of the thousand protesters were
kneeling, save for one agitator far in the back threatening to throw a
rock? While these latter questions speak more to the sufficiency of the
evidence at trial (or given qualified immunity, more likely summary
judgment) than class certification, they further illustrate the difficulties
of using aggregation to afford any real relief in the context of mass
protest policing abuses.
C.

State Standing

In the absence of a viable class claim for mass protest policing
improprieties, the remaining vehicle may be the most powerful of all:
the state parens patriaelawsuit. When a state sues, its interest in the suit
is usually classified as sovereign, quasi-sovereign, or proprietary. 217
Sovereign interests include the structural rights of governments to
create and enforce a legal code. 218 Proprietary interests include those
that a state shares with any other litigant - they derive from its role as
a landowner or a party to a contract. 219 When states sue to protect their
own interests, whether proprietary or sovereign, they must show
standing under conventional Article III doctrine or a state analog. 220
When states sue as parens patriae, on the other hand, they seek to
protect their quasi-sovereign interests, defined as "a set of interests the
State has in the well-being of its populace." 221

216 See Fields, supra note 10, at 979 (noting the "split-second syndrome" infecting
the Court's reasonable use of force doctrine); Diana Hassel, Excessive Reasonableness, 43
IND. L. REV. 117,120 (2009).
217 See Seth Davis, State Standing for Equality, 79 LA. L. REV. 147, 153 (2018);
Katherine Mims Crocker, Note, Securing Sovereign State Standing, 97 VA. L. REV. 2051,

2077-78 (2011).
218 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982)
(recognizing a state's "sovereign interesti]" in "the power to create and enforce a legal
code"); see also Ernest A. Young, State Standing and CooperativeFederalism, 94 NOTRE
DAMEL. REV.

1893,1915(2019).

219 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007) (recognizing a state's
proprietary interest as a landowner); Young, supra note 218, at 1897-98 ("The
distinction between proprietary and governmental interests and actions is notoriously
indeterminate, and ... proprietary interests in property or contractual rights are hardly
the only interests that states share in common with private entities.").
220 See Davis, supra note 217, at 154.
221 Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602 (explaining that the quasi-sovereign interest giving rise to
parens patriae standing, is a "judicial construct that does not lend itself to a simple or
exact definition" but which implicates the state's interest in the well-being of its
residents and in maintaining its proper place in the federal system).
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These interests have their roots in the common law, which attributed
to the sovereign the right to bring suit for those citizens who could not
protect themselves. 222 Generally, those interests exist in two categories:
the State's interest in the well-being of its residents, 223 and the State's
interest in ensuring it and its citizens are not discriminatorily denied
their rightful status within the federal system. 224 When a state invokes
parens patriae standing, it "litigates as a representative for its
citizens." 225 Consequently, parens patriae standing is more likely to be
recognized when, for whatever reason, no more appropriate party is
available. 226 Importantly, states asserting standing as parens patriaestill
must meet the other constitutional requirements of standing. The injury
alleged "must be sufficiently concrete to create an actual controversy"
and sufficiently generalized to represent an injury to the state as a
whole. 227
However, to gain parens patriae standing, the state must be able to
articulate a sovereign interest that is more than, or different from, a
simple aggregation of the injuries to individual citizens. 228 Courts have
recognized this quasi-sovereign interest as sufficient to confer standing

222 FRANCIS C. AMENDOLA, JOSEPH BASSANO, JAMES BUCHWALTER, PAUL M. COLTOFF,
STEPHEN LEASE, ERIC MAYER & JEANNE M. REISER, 91 C.J.S. UNITED STATES § 311 (2021).

223 "Well-being" is interpreted broadly to include physical and economic well-being
as well as protection from "the political, social, and moral damage of discrimination."
Snapp, 458 U.S. at 609. Thus, an assertion of quasi-sovereign standing is, according to
some scholars, an assertion of the State's police power and has a similar reach. See
Crocker, supra note 217, at 2082-83.
224 Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607.
225 Crocker, supra note 217, at 2072 (quoting ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION § 2.3.7 (5th ed. 2007)). In this sense, parens patriaesuits are in some ways
analogous to class action suits, with the State serving as the class representative, but
courts have resisted treating them as class actions. See, e.g., Addison Automatics, Inc. v.
Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 731 F.3d 740, 744 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting there are "important
procedural differences between class actions and paren partiae actions" and "[s]uch
suits . . . should not be considered representative actions subject to Rule 23.").
226 See Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 977 (1976) (providing an overview of the historical development and application
of the parens patriae doctrine and denying standing because "the suit [was] a direct
attempt by a state to insert itself between the national government and the legitimate
objects of its administrative authority").
227 Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602; see Kleppe, 533 F.2d at 675.
228 See Table Bluff Rsrv. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 256 F.3d 879, 885-86 (9th Cir. 2001).
Further, parens patriae standing is available only to U.S. States. Estados Unidos
Mexicanos v. DeCoster, 229 F.3d 332, 336 (1st Cir. 2000) ("[P]arens patriae standing
should not be recognized in a foreign nation unless there is a clear indication of intent
to grant such standing expressed by the Supreme Court or by the two coordinate
branches of government.").

2021]

Protest Policingand the Fourth Amendment

most prominently in
another, where the
widespread and where
States have also sued
economic well-being

391

environmental cases that pit one state against
environmental injuries are both sufficiently
the state as an entity has also suffered damage. 229
other states, and private parties, to protect the
of their citizens 230 and to seek redress for

discrimination. 23 1

These last two interests most directly affect the Fourth Amendment
analysis. Police brutality can have devastating, long-term economic
impacts on victims, particularly if injuries sustained cause long-term
disability or otherwise interfere with the ability to work. The significant
dignitary harm caused by excessive violence at the hands of powerful
state actors also exacts an economic toll. 232 That dignitary harm is
compounded when unlawful violence is exacted for discriminatory
motives, either express or structural. The history of unlawful violence
to Black bodies at the hands of police officers, both individually and in
aggregate, illustrates how structural, pervasive discrimination exacted
against a state's citizens implicates Fourth Amendment concerns, and
thus, the propriety of parens patriae state standing to redress this
harmful and widespread discrimination. 233
And yet, the quasi-sovereign interest sufficient to confer parens
patriae standing has rarely, if ever, been recognized in the Fourth
Amendment context. Two primary reasons appear to exist for this limit.
First, "parenspatriaestanding is inappropriate where an aggrieved party

229 See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 603. See generally Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 220
(1901) (the first case to apply parens patriaestanding, involving attempt by Missouri to
enjoin Illinois from dumping sewage into the Mississippi River). The early parens
patriae cases nearly all concerned environmental issues. See, e.g., North Dakota v.
Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 371 (1923) (describing changes to the course of the Mustinka
River in Minnesota that led to flooding of North Dakota farmland); New York v. New
Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 299 (1921) (describing New Jersey's discharge of sewage into the
Passaic River, which drained into New York's Upper Bay); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co.,
206 U.S. 230, 236 (1907) (describing a copper mine's discharge of sulfur into the air,
which then blew into Georgia).
230 See, e.g., Snapp, 458 U.S. at 594 (alleging discrimination against Puerto Rican
migrant workers); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 739 (1981) (alleging
discriminatory state taxation on natural gas); Georgia v. Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 450
(1945) (litigating antitrust violations).
231 E.g., Snapp, 458 U.S. at 594 (Puerto Rico suing Virginia over apple growers'
systematic discrimination against Puerto Rican migrant workers).
232 See Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testifying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 835-36,
865 (2008) (describing the corrosive long-term impact of illegitimate policing on
communities of color).
233

See id. at 844-49.
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could seek private relief." 234 In virtually all excessive force cases, private
individuals or their estates could seek private redress via Section 1983.
Second, parens patriae standing is typically only appropriate "if the
health or well-being of an entire population is threatened, and
individuals are incapable of pursuing their own interests." 235
This second limitation doomed Rosenblum, where Oregon attempted
to "support a parens theory of standing . . . with no more than two
identifiable unlawful seizures." 236 In granting the federal agencies' joint
motion to dismiss, the court presumed that Oregon's "theory [of parens
patriaestanding] is that the State of Oregon is harmed when its citizens
are subjected to widespread unlawful seizures of their persons." 237 The
court acknowledged that "this could be a quasi-sovereign interest to
support a parens theory of standing" in cases alleging widespread harm,
"this is not that case." 238 Absent proof of either sustained, widespread
harm to a significant portion of its citizens or a singular command
decision affecting a large group of demonstrators at once, the court
reasoned that parens patriaedid not apply. 239
But to deny parens patriae standing in all protest policing contexts
would unnecessarily restrict the doctrine. In many such cases, states
arguably could satisfy the implicit numerosity and magnitude of harm
requirements inherent in parens patriae cases, not only because of the
size of assembled groups subjected to police violence, but because of
the likelihood of future peacefully assembled protests in the future
likely to affect a sizeable portion of the populace. Moreover, the
fundamental constitutional nature of both the First Amendment right
to peaceful assembly and the Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable seizures counsels in favor of broader parens patriae
standing. At least in cases where the state can identify "more than two"
cases of violations, and especially in cases turning on centralized
command decisions to employ violence against large groups of
demonstrators, courts should recognize the state's ability to protect
234 Mo. ex rel. Koster v. Harris, 847 F.3d 646, 652 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that
"complete relief would be available to the [injured] egg farmers themselves, were they
to file a complaint on their own behalf').
235 Navajo Nation v. Barr, No. CV-18-08072-PCT-GMS, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
77513, at *12 (D. Ariz. May 8, 2019) (denying Navajo Nation parens patriaestanding
to bring a wrongful death claim against Winslow police officers on behalf of an
individual decedent, because "the complaint does not articulate how the shooting of
Loreal Tsingine . . injured other members of the Navajo Nation living in Winslow").
236 Rosenblum v. Does 1-10, 474 F. Supp. 3d 1128, 1134 (D. Or. 2020).
237
238
239

Id. at 1133-34.
Id. at 1130-34.
Id. at 1137.
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both the health and well-being of the existing large, injured group and
groups at risk of similar future command decisions.
The Lafayette Square Park experience, where officers followed a
single, preordained command decision to use tear gas and pepper balls
regardless of the threat posed by the crowd, serves as one example of an
appropriate "health and well-being" parens patriae case. 240 The 1,000
protesters' experience in Edrei who were exposed to a single, long-range
acoustic device blast, is another. 241 These actions could seek injunctive
relief and prospective reforms through negotiated consent decrees to
change policing practices, in addition to redress for past harms.
Somewhere between the Rosenblum and Edrei extremes lies State of
New York, the pending parens patriae action brought by New York
Attorney General Letitia James. 242 The lawsuit challenges several
individual crowd control decisions, listing isolated incidents wherein
"police officers unlawfully used pepper spray and battered protesters
with fists and batons." 243 But it also alleges a series of command
decisions affecting large groups of similarly situated citizens, including
"detain[ing] observers and medics for curfew violations and corrall[ing]
large groups of demonstrators without giving them a chance to
disperse." 244 Perhaps bolstering her own claim to parens patriae
standing, James summarized the case in a press conference by claiming
that "NYPD engaged in a pattern of excessive, brutal, and unlawful force
against peaceful protesters." 245
But even if a state can demonstrate sufficient widespread impact on
its citizens, there remains the question of citizens' incapacity to
otherwise litigate on their own behalf. Here, two novel theories of
incapacity, both based on the Supreme Court's narrow substantive
rights jurisprudence, may justify parens patriaestanding in the protest
policing context. First, the undeniable disparate impact of police
240 See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
241 See Edrei v. City of New York, 254 F. Supp. 3d 565, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
242 See generally Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 27
(alleging the NYPD both used physical force against protesters at specific protests from
May 28, 2020, to December 11, 2020, and consistently used "unlawful excessive force
and false arrest practices while policing large-scale protests" generally).
243 Jacob Gershman & Ben Chapman, New York State Attorney General Sues NYPD
Over Protest Response, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 14, 2021, 2:38 PM ET),
https-/www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-attorney-general-sues-nypd-over-protest-response-

11610650600 thttps://perma.cc/5BCV-FXA7].
244 Id. The suit also alleges systematic failures, including "failing to train and
supervise officers and for allowing or encouraging flagrant violations of constitutional
protections against excessive police force and unlawful detention." Id.
245

Id.
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violence on communities of color highlights how large swaths of a
state's citizenry suffer unjust and unlawful excessive force on the basis
of race. 246 But virtually none of these potential litigants can successfully
maintain discrimination claims in their own right, because the Supreme
Court only recognizes government discrimination claims evidenced by
"discriminatory purpose" or "animus," not damning evidence of
disparate impact and structural racial inequality. 24 7
This narrowly constructed discrimination jurisprudence does not, in
itself, mean individuals lack standing to bring disparate impact claims,
only that such claims are doomed to fail pre-trial. Thus, a state's ability
to assert parens patriae standing based on its citizens' "incapacity"
depends on whether courts interpret "incapacity" to mean legal inability
to assert standing or practical incapacity to seek meaningful relief. In
the racial discrimination protest policing context, the difference should
not matter. Moreover, allowing a state to proceed parens patriae on a
disparate impact theory would accord with the primary purpose of the
doctrine: to allow a state to seek redress for pervasive injuries to a
populace that citizens themselves cannot obtain.
A state, in contrast, may satisfactorily maintain such a claim, arguing
not that the state itself is subject to purposeful discrimination but that
the evidentiary record belies any suggestion that a large percentage of
its population does not suffer significant harm from excessive police
violence. Claims of disparate racial treatment in the protest-policing
context demand greater recognition and more adequate legal reform
vehicles, particularly considering the utter lack of police resistance
White supremacists faced when they mounted the nation's first
attempted insurrection at the United States Capitol on January 6,
2021.248
246 See Ross, supra note 38, at 12; see also Ray Sanchez, Harvard Study Finds
Institutional Racism 'Permeates'the MassachusettsJustice System, CNN (Sept. 12, 2020,
4:09 PM ET), https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/12/us/harvard-racial-disparity-criminaljustice-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/5A5Y-YCUU] (summarizing key findings,
including that "Black people -- who represent 24% of the city's population -- accounted
for 63% of people interrogated, stopped, frisked or searched. Latinos make up 12% of
the population but were subjected to 18% of those encounters.. . . The disparity . .
was more consistent with racial bias than with differences in criminal conduct").
247 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976); see also Ian F. Haney L6pez, "A
Nation of Minorities": Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV.
985, 989, 995 n.31 (2007) (challenging the trend towards "colorblindness" in judicial
review post-Davis); Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53
UCLA L. REv. 701, 728, 725-32 (2006) (noting changing nature of racial discrimination
claims after Davis).
248 Nandita Bose & Makini Brice, If Rioters Were Black, 'Hundreds'Would Have Been

Killed: Washington Reflects on Capitol Rampage,

REUTERS

(Jan. 8, 2021, 4:06 AM),
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Second, the Supreme Court's artificially narrow Fourth Amendment
standing doctrine ironically may help. The Court has been more than
willing to recognize actual Article III injuries in fact to "targets" of
police abuse but nevertheless deny Fourth Amendment "substantive"
standing. One novel, as yet untested approach, may be for a state to
assert its parens patriae interest in protecting real party in question
citizens who are legally incapable of proceeding in their own right. The
Utah Department of Commerce made just such an argument in United
States DOJ v. Utah DOC.249 While the court recognized that, generally,
"no party . .. may assert the substantive Fourth Amendment rights of
any investigative target," it nevertheless acknowledged the state's ability
to assert standing under a parens patriae theory. 250 Without ruling on
whether this standing theory might otherwise succeed, it denied
standing to the state on the unrelated ground that "states may not
invoke the parens patriae doctrine in order to assert the constitutional
rights of their residents against the federal government." 251
This holding raises a further parens patriae wrinkle that arose in
Rosenblum: whether, if at all, states can sue federal agencies like those
secretively roaming Portland in July 2020 for violating their citizens'
Fourth Amendment rights. In general, parens patriae standing is
unavailable to States against the federal government. In Massachusetts v.
Mellon,252 the Supreme Court barred parens patriae standing for States
suing the federal government. 253 The Court erected what became
https-/www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-inequality/if-rioters-were-black-hundredswould-have-been-killed-washington-reflects-on-capitol-rampage-idUSKBN29D1HM
[https://perma.cc/QL2P-8KRK] (quoting President-elect Biden: "No one can tell me that
if it had been a group of Black Lives Matter protesters . . . they wouldn't have been
treated very, very differently from the mob of thugs that stormed the Capitol"); Jeremy

Kohler, "Sense of Entitlement": Rioters Faced Few Consequences Invading State Capitols.
No Wonder They Turned to the U.S. Capitol Next, PROPUBLIcA (Jan. 19, 2021, 2:56 PM EST),
https-/www.propublica.org/article/sense-of-entitlement-rioters-faced-no-consequencesinvading-state-capitols-no-wonder-they-tumrned-to-the-u-s-capitol-next thttps://perma.cc/

3J6E-Y45D].
249 No. 2:16-cv-611-DN-DBP, 2017 U.S Dist. LEXIS 118470, at *13 (D. Utah July 27,

2017).
250 Id. at *12-13.
251 Id. It is questionable whether such a theory would or should work, because,
unlike search cases, there rarely exists individual "target versus standing" issues in the
seizure context. See supra section II.A.
252 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
253 Id. at 485-86 (emphasizing that "[i]t cannot be conceded that a state, as parens
patriae, may institute judicial proceedings to protect [its citizens who are also] citizens
of the United States, from the operation of a statute [of the United States]" upon the
ground that, as applied to them, it is unconstitutional); see also Snapp & Sons, Inc. v.
Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 610 n.16 (1982) ("A State does not have standing
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known as the "Mellon bar," reasoning that "[t]he individual's dual
citizenship in both state and nation, with separate rights and obligations
arising from each, suggests that both units of government act as parens
patriae within their separate spheres of activity." 254 Thus, the
overlapping federalism spheres within which each sovereign operates
should not be disturbed to protect the rights of a citizen of both
sovereigns.
The Mellon bar suggests suits like Rosenblum, wherein states challenge
excessive force by federal agents against their own citizens, are
automatically barred. But maybe not. While most federal circuits appear
to have read Mellon to provide an absolute bar against states naming the
federal government as a defendant, thereby denying States parens
patriaestanding against any federal defendants, the doctrine may not be
as absolute as it appears. 255 In Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, the court noted
that "it is debatable whether the Court in [Mellon] meant to bar all state
parens patriae suits against the Federal Government." 256 The Mellon
Court itself prefaces its holding with a qualifier: "We need not go so far
as to say that a state may never intervene by suit to protect its citizens
against any form of enforcement of unconstitutional acts by
Congress." 257 The contradiction between this qualification and the flat
denial of parens patriae standing against federal defendants, just a few
sentences later, creates an ambiguity, as the Kleppe court recognized. 258
Seven decades after Mellon, the Supreme Court acknowledged this
ambiguity and arguably opened the door to another set of exceptions.
In a footnote to Massachusettsv. EPA, the Court commented that "there

is a critical difference between allowing a State 'to protect her citizens
from the operation of federal statutes' (which is what Mellon prohibits)
and allowing a State to assert its rights under federal law (which it has

as parenspatriae to bring an action against the Federal Government. ... Here, however,
the Commonwealth is seeking to secure the federally created interests of its residents
against private defendants.").
254 Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668, 676-77 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 977 (1976) (italics added).
255 See, e.g., Manitoba v. Bernhardt, 923 F.3d 173, 183 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (finding that
"[t]here is no reason to treat parens patriaeactions alleging constitutional claims against
the federal government differently . . .. We doubt the Supreme Court meant in footnote
seventeen to create an exception to the Mellon bar based on such a distinction");
Citizens Against Ruining the Env't v. EPA, 535 F.3d 670, 675-76 (7th Cir. 2008) ("A
state may not bring parens patriaesuit against the federal government .... ").
256 Kleppe, 533 F.2d at 677.
257 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485 (1923) (emphasis added).
258 Kleppe, 533 F.2d at 678 n.52 (declining to engage with the ambiguity, choosing
instead to base its reading on "the narrower reading" of Mellon).
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standing to do)."259 A number of courts have noted the impossibility of
reconciling Massachusetts v. E.P.A. with a reading of Mellon as providing
an absolute bar. 260
Generally, this pair of propositions appears to mean that a state
cannot sue to question, on its people's behalf, the constitutionality of a
given federal statute. 26 ' However, it may be able to sue as patriaparens
either to compel implementation of federal law or to allege that an
agency act is illegal under federal law. 262 On this interpretation, protest
policing cases bringing federal Fourth Amendment challenges to
particular agency actions would appear to fit squarely within the
permissible exception. This allowance makes sense, both as a matter of
parens patriae purpose and Mellon bar exception. The core purpose of
state parens patriae standing is to protect citizens from oppressive
conduct when they cannot effectively do so themselves. 263 Arguably,
there can be no more oppressive power imbalance than a widespread
campaign to brutalize mass groups of citizens by armed federal agents,
at least where they have the blessing of the President and the benefit of
operating in the unaccountable shadows. Moreover, challenging a
specific unlawful executive agency action is not at odds with the
structural sovereignty purpose of the Mellon bar, which seeks to avoid
264
inter-sovereign battles over broad legislative prerogatives.
No precedent decisions exist to test this theory in the Fourth
Amendment context. But the experience of States exploring the limits

259 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521 n.17 (2007) (quoting Georgia v. Pa. R.R.
Co., 324 U.S. 439, 447 (1945)); cf. Bernhardt,923 F.3d at 182 ("Massachusetts v. EPA is
not a parens patriaecase.").
260 See Aziz v. Trump, 231 F. Supp. 3d 23, 31 (E.D. Va. 2017).
261 A state can always file suit on its own behalf, if it can allege an injury to its own
proprietary or sovereign interests, for instance by arguing that a federal law infringes
on its own sovereign prerogatives. See infra notes 264-270.
262 Cf. Bernhardt, 923 F.3d at 182 (rejecting this reasoning in a section flatly titled
"The Mellon Bar Has No Exception").
263 Jason Mazzone & Stephen Rushin, State Attorneys General as Agents of Police
Reform, 69 DUKE L.J. 999, 1033 (2020) ("Historically, parens patriae standing has been
a powerful basis on which state governments have brought lawsuits to remedy problems
that could not otherwise be addressed by private litigants.").
264 Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668, 676-77 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (exploring the
federalism and sovereignty sought to be protected by the Mellon bar, including
maintaining "the proper allocation of authorities within the federal system"); cf. David
M. Howard, State Parens Patriae Standing to Challenge the Federal Government:
Overruling the Mellon Bar, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1089, 1129 (2018) (asserting that
states "must act as parens patriae in place of the federal government" in such cases,
which "maintains the federalism principles of our nation, the principles that most
correlate to the purpose of the parens patriae doctrine").
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of Mellon bar exceptions in other contexts suggests protest policing
Fourth Amendment challenges might survive standing challenges. For
example, in Aziz v. Trump,265 the court allowed parens patriaestanding
for Virginia to challenge the constitutionality of the first iteration of
President Trump's so-called "Muslim Ban" Executive Order. There, the
court held that "a state is not to be barred by the Mellon doctrine from
a parens patriae challenge to executive action when the state has
grounds to argue that the executive action is contrary to federal
statutory or constitutionallaw." 266 Yet in three other recent cases, where
states challenged the constitutionality of federal acts themselves instead
of federal actions, courts denied parens patriae standing as prohibited
by the Mellon bar. 267
A final, as yet untested, theory of state standing to bring protest
policing claims against the federal government involves the state's
sovereign interest to bring claims when it suffers a pecuniary loss. States
increasingly take on the mantle of "ideological litigant" by claiming a
broad public injury has caused the state damages. 266 This "new public
standing" 269 has allowed states the "special solicitude" 270 to represent
its citizens as public litigants under the guise of a "paradigmatic" 27 1
pecuniary interest. States have brought several high-profile public law
cases against the federal government for financial injuries, perhaps none
more famous than the travel ban litigations pursued by the States of

265 231 F. Supp. 3d 31 (E.D. Va. 2017).
266 Id. at 31-32 (emphasis added) (finding parens patriae on the grounds that the
Executive Order affected the State's quasi-sovereign interests by discriminating against
a portion of its citizens after the State alleged that the order violated the First, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendments, as well as several statutes). In later proceedings, the court
granted a temporary injunction. Aziz v. Trump, 234 F. Supp. 3d 724, 739 (E.D. Va.

2017).
267 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966) (denying South
Carolina standing to challenge provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as an
unconstitutional Bill of Attainder); Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. United States, 369
F. Supp. 2d 237, 245 (D. Conn. 2005) (denying Connecticut standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the Magnuson-Stevens Act under the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause, because it presented no evidence that any individual's due process rights
were violated); People ex rel. Hartigan v. Cheney, 726 F. Supp. 219, 227 (C.D. Ill. 1989)
(denying Illinois standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Base Closure Act).
268

269

See Davis, supra note 159, at 1229, 1234.
Id. at 1229.

270 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007); see also Davis, supra note 159,
at 1283-84 (cautioning against a broad interpretation of this "special solicitude"
doctrine to allow state standing "in every case in which a state sues the federal
government based upon a financial injury").
271 Danvers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286, 291 (3d Cir. 2005).
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Washington and Hawaii. 272 The doctrinal difficulty with this new public
standing "is that while some financial injuries to the state mirror those
to private parties, others do not," including "quintessential" Fourth
Amendment injuries. 273 These cases also present the normative
challenge that "state attorneys general who sue based on upon financial
injuries to their states are ideological litigants" and not parties litigating
direct state financial injuries. 274 These concerns, and the admittedly
uneven fit between protesters' personal injuries from crowd control
techniques and any derivative state financial injury, renders the viability
of state sovereign standing in protest policing cases doubtful. For the
time being at least, and if recent litigations from the Summer of Racial
Reckoning are any indication, states are content to assert quasisovereign interests on behalf of citizens with tangible, physical,
financial injuries.
CONCLUSION

Police reform deserves all the scholarly and political attention it has
received in recent years. The murders of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor,
and countless others serve as catalysts to remind us of the "fierce
urgency of now" to resolve an entrenched, centuries-old problem in this
country. 275 Ironically, police brutality against activists demanding these
reforms further illustrates the need to redefine reasonable use of force
and reframe the role of law enforcement in public life. But these
conversations must be guided by a better understanding of
fundamental, threshold issues about the applicability of constitutional
guarantees against police abuse, and thus the availability of the legal
mechanisms necessary to help drive change.
This Article has attempted to sketch the contours of these threshold
questions in one specific Fourth Amendment context - protest272 See Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 765 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam), vacated as
moot per curiam, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017) (finding State of Hawaii had standing to
challenge travel ban based on its proprietary interest in its public universities, which
were harmed by the denial of entry of faculty, staff, and students under the ban);
Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1158-59, 1161 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam)
(same).
273 Davis, supra note 159, at 1229.
274

Id.

275 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., "I Have a Dream" Address at the March on
Washington for Jobs and Freedom (Aug. 28, 1963), in A CALL TO CONSCIENCE: THE
LANDMARK SPEECHES OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING,

JR. 82 (Clayborne

Carson

& Kris

Shephard eds., 2001) ("We have ... come to this hallowed spot to remind America of
the fierce urgency of now. This is no time ... to engage in the luxury of cooling off or
to take the tranquilizing drug of gradualism.").
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policing methods against crowds of peaceful protesters - and provide
a principled theoretical roadmap for the viability of excessive force
claims where existing doctrine unjustly closes the courthouse door. The
present moment portends an increase in classes of demonstrators
bringing dispersal-driven excessive force claims and states pursuing
structural remedies in their quasi-sovereign capacities on behalf of
abused protesters. The original, textual, and doctrinal support exists to
recognize and hear the merits of these claims. Courts need only be
willing to cross the Fourth Amendment threshold do so.

